INTRODUCTION

The democracy movement in Korea from the late 1960s through the 1980s evolved over time, encompassing various societal groups. One of these major groups was Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, who joined the movement in protest of the authoritarian regime. These churches briefly served as the face of the movement, using tactics of declarations and occasional protests in order to criticize the regime.

However, the churches’ role extended beyond declarations. As social institutions, the churches had a broader influence on the movement and the various groups that constituted it. Through both formal and informal connections, the churches had influence over, and were influenced by, other activist groups. Some of these influences were intentional, as groups within the churches formed community engagement organizations that directly connected the churches with Korean society’s disadvantaged actors. Others were less obvious. The churches’ influence on people as members of denominations, as youth within their ranks, and as civically engaged members of society helped create the conditions for anti-governmental action by different societal groups.

The quality underlying the churches’ influence was social capital. As institutions that fostered unique social interactions, the churches influenced how a number of Koreans related to one another. Specifically, this organizational influence imbued Korean citizens with certain community organizing skills, as well as networks that helped initially foster pro-democracy activist groups, protect those groups from government repression later on, and develop linkages between those groups.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Authoritarianism in South Korea
The Korean War and Syngman Rhee

With Korea’s liberation came its division. Due to political vacuum, competition, and the influence of strong global powers (the US and USSR) partitioning Korea, the division between North and South became clear and extreme. These tensions spawned a brutal civil war that decimated virtually the entirety of the country. The violence used to establish control at this time framed leadership for the following decades.

In the south, the US desired one quality in a leader: vehement opposition to communism. Partly due to his time spent in the US, which made himself a known person the US could trust, Syngman Rhee was put into power by the US and ruled from 1948 to 1960. Rhee’s government was decidedly Christian: he was a church elder, his vice president and acting prime minister were church ministers, a quarter of the National Assembly was Christian, most of them church leaders, and an estimated 40% of all political positions were filled by Christians, despite the fact that Christians made up around 10% of the population (Park and Pak 2011, ‘Protestant Christians and South Korean Politics, 1948–1980s:’ 174). In 1959, Rhee forced the legislature to allow him to run despite having reached his two-term limit. Moreover, he executed his primary political opponent. After winning his 1960 election, students protested en masse in the 4.19 student uprising, which, after a severe government crackdown, sparked nationwide insurrection. With the military losing faith in his leadership and with pressure from the US, Rhee abdicated in 1960.

The Park Chung Hee Era

Rhee’s abdication led to chaos within South Korea. As a result, in 1961 General Park Chung Hee took power via a quiet military coup. In 1963, he was officially elected president, and then re-elected in 1967. In 1969, he forced a Constitutional amendment that allowed him to run for a third term. In 1972, he extended this reach, eliminating the democratic constitution in
favor of the Yusin Constitution, effectively institutionalizing authoritarianism (Chang 2015a; Chang 2015b). Park’s iron grip extended beyond politics to Korean society itself. His government aggressively regulated its people’s lives, implementing a curfew and regulating hair and clothing style.

Many accepted this authoritarian rule due to Park’s economic policy. With state control of banks, the state effectively dictated the entire country’s economic policy. Park focused on industrializing the nation, exploiting cheap labor and using the state to help grow a small handful of companies at the expense of free market competition. This industrialization process led the government to recruit thousands of workers, including many young women, away from their agricultural jobs in the country to industrial jobs in the city, changing the makeup of the nation. Part of this economic control was state control of labor, politically demobilizing unions and allowing exploitative working conditions. Despite this harsh rule, many people looked up to Park for creating this ‘economic miracle’ that reversed the poverty and ruin the country suffered from the war.

Segments of society did, however, protest his rule. After he amended the Constitution to allow for him to run for a third term in 1969, students began to speak out. In the 1970s, the protest movement diversified, with intellectuals and professors, journalists, lawyers, workers and those associated with the labor movement, and Christian political activists joining the fight. In particular, Christians played a large role in the mid-1970s, before the movement truly diversified and society more broadly began to vocally protest Park’s rule. This diversity of protestors created a diversity of issues about which the movement was concerned, a diversity of demands upon the state, and a diversity of protest tactics used.
In 1979, the head of the KCIA, Kim Jae-Kyu, assassinated Park; in 1980, General Chun Doo Hwan took power and instituted martial law. In the same year Chun took power, students protesting his rule created the Kwangju Uprising (or the 5.18 Uprising), in which the army fired into a crowd of students and attacked the citizens of Kwangju. As Chun’s government became increasingly repressive, the democracy movement became more radical and more covert. In the late 1980s the middle class also became more vocal, and international attention due to the 1988 Olympics increased pressure on the regime. As a result, a reform in 1987 allowed for direct presidential elections. Chun was succeeded by Roh Tae Woo, another General, after two progressive candidates split the progressive vote. However, the democracy movement became better established and institutionalized, and by 1993 Korea elected its first non-military leader.

**Christianity in Korea**

*Introduction to Korea*

Unlike its introduction to most other East Asian areas at the time, Christianity started on its own internally rather than being introduced by outsiders. Reform-minded Shilha Confucian Scholars encountered Western religious texts and explored them to better understand the world. In 1631, Chong Tu-won sent an envoy to China which brought back the first Catholic missionary in Korea, Matteo Ricci. Again, the interest in Christianity was mainly academic at the time. In the 1780s, Yi Song-hun traveled to China, was baptized, and then returned to Korea with religious texts. The beginnings of Christianity in Korea sprouted from these texts, with Koreans performing the practices they found in these texts, incorporating them into traditional Confucian practices, all without the presence of missionaries. As a result, a Korean indigenization process shaped how Christianity emerged in Korea.
Soon thereafter, a slow trickle of representatives of the church entered Korea. Chinese priest Zhou Wen-mo arrived in 1795. A half-century later, in 1844, the first two clergymen arrived in Korea. Over this period of time, the church experienced rapid growth, with an estimated 4,000 Korean Catholics in 1795 and 10,000 in 1801; moreover, by 1910, Korea had 69 churches and 71 priests, including 15 Koreans. At this time, the religion was primarily practiced by the yangban class.

In the mid 1800s, a religious thinking which incorporated aspects of Catholic thinking arose, called Tonghuk. In 1894, this thinking led to the Tonghuk Uprising, in which Korean peasants rebelled against the Choson dynasty. Due to its relation to Tonghuk, its emphasis of loyalty to God over loyalty to king, and its tenets that challenged traditional Confucian customs such as ancestor worship, Christianity the Choson dynasty began persecuting Christians.

Protestantism arrived later than Catholicism, with John Ross visiting the Korean border from China in 1874 and 1876, then translating the New Testament into Korean in 1882. In the same year, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the US opened Korea so missionaries could enter as representatives of diplomatic legations or charitable organizations. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the Protestant Church took on a global focus of missionary work, which helped to spread Protestantism in Korea. Missionaries entered Korea, and as part of their work, they began the tradition of establishing primary and secondary schools, universities, religious schools, and hospitals. By 1905, the Protestant Church had baptized an estimated 9,000 Koreans. Part of this growth was due to political cover; the Choson dynasty supported limited Protestant church action as a result of Horace Allen saving the life of Queen Min’s nephew after the Kapsin Coup in 1884. Moreover, it appealed to the lower classes in Korea’s rigid social structure, offering them religion, education, and medicine. One important
factor of its growth was its material focus: due to the indigenization process combining it with shamanism and Confucian ideas of prayer, Christianity in Korea had a strong this-worldly focus. This characteristic of the church exists to this day, with the church owning millions of dollars worth of assets and many still praying for material prosperity.

Christianity in the Colonial Period

With the Conspiracy Case of 105 in 1910, the occupation Japanese government fabricated allegations against Korean citizens, many of whom were Christians. This event stoked anti-Japanese sentiment in the Christian community in Korea, and Christians played a disproportionately large role in the March 1, 1919 independence movement, both in terms of leadership and proportion of the population arrested. In the war mobilization years of occupation, the Japanese government mandated that all Koreans perform Shinto shrine worship to the Japanese Emperor, sparking a fierce debate among denominations over whether or not to refuse and risk persecution. Moreover, the ‘colonial regime created a state-controlled church, or Kyodan,’ further stoking anti-Japanese sentiment (Clark 2002: 171). Thus, in the Colonial period, the Christian church served a role as an institution opposed to the colonial government.

Christianity Post-Liberation

The Protestant church saw a second explosion of growth after the end of World War II. In South Korea, the new US-controlled government reversed the suppression of religion and created a climate for Western religions to flourish. At the same time, in the north, the Soviet-influenced government increased religious persecution, spurring an exodus of Christians to the south. With the war, many refugees joined the well-organized church, which provided material and social support (Park and Pak 2011a). In fact, due to its organizational strength and relation to the West, the church became a primary network for distribution of post-war relief aid (Kim 2002). This
growth culminated in ‘between seventy and one hundred denominations and other groupings within the Korean Protestant church in the 1970s’ (Park and Pak 2011b: 95).

The Protestant church in this period was strongly tied to the authoritarian governments in charge. However, a number of liberal Protestant denominations, as well as many Catholics, took part in anti-government protests for democracy. Specifically, they entered the movement in the 1970s, with involvement peaking in the mid 1970s and continuing to a lesser degree into the 1980s, as measured by the number of protest events by Christians over that time period. Many believe that General Park Chung Hee’s successful attempt to amend the constitution in 1968 to allow for him to serve for a third term sparked the beginning of this growth of church involvement (Kang 1997b: 100).

In the political arena after liberation, a disproportionately large number of Korean leaders were Christian (Kim 2000). This dynamic helps explain why the Protestant church was so close to the authoritarian government. After the war, the US government supported the church as a social organization, and those with economic and social capital assumed both church and political leadership. Thus, many of the leaders of the church were invested in the government starting under the rule of Syngman Rhee. This also created a dynamic where leaders of denominations competed with one another, which occasionally engendered factionalism in denominations (Park and Pak 2011b). This dynamic explains why ‘only 542 pastors and 831 churches out of 11,582 clergy and 17,793 churches in the Protestant community were involved in this activism against the regime’ (Park and Pak 2011, ‘Protestant Christians and South Korean Politics, 1948–1980s:’ 183). In the context of the pro-democracy movement, then, the Protestant church as a whole took a passive stance. However, a subsection of the church split with the majority and played a vital role in the movement.
CHRISTIANITY AND THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT

Social Capital and the Churches’ Organizational Impact on Individuals’ Social and Political Activity

Today, relational trust in Korea is quite weak. In a measure of generalized trust based on survey responses to the question ‘Most people can be trusted,’ only 26.5% of the population exhibited positive responses. Of nine sample countries, this rate was second-lowest; for comparison, China’s generalized trust rate was 60.3% (Yee 2015). This demonstrates an important aspect about Korean society: most people regard others with suspicion, which both demotivates creating coalitions and broad networks and solidifies closed networks. This lack of generalized trust was even greater during the post-war era and under Park’s leadership:

‘Traditional rural communities were dismantled during the rapid industrialization process, yet the drastic social change was not accompanied by a corresponding development of organizational principles suitable for urban and modern life’ (Yee 2015). Traditionally, many groups such as local villages outside of the capital provided such organizational platforms; however, with industrialization, they could no longer play this role.

The church filled this vacuum of organizational influence and trust-building institutions. In Korea, both Catholicism and Protestantism had a marked impact on social capital. First, Catholicism emphasizes charity and philanthropy, thus creating involvement in local communities. Protestantism traditionally does as well, though due to its material focus in Korea many denominations do not emphasize it to as great of an extent (nevertheless, a subset of denominations do emphasize it heavily). Second, both religions have high levels of institutionalization. In addition to the incredibly high number of denominations, churches, and members in Korea in the 1950s-1970s, the churches possessed vast organizational networks. The
Protestant church controlled around 75% of all colleges and universities, a quarter of high schools, around 100 hospitals, and radio broadcasting, newspapers, and television stations; the Catholic church had a similarly extensive reach. Finally, the Catholic church had significant autonomy from the state, providing the organizational platforms for activism (the Protestant church did not enjoy similar autonomy due to its strong ties to the state) (Hoi 2008).

General sociological reasoning supports this conclusion that religious institutions influence social capital. A meta-analysis of studies of religions in America found that religions create organizational environments that teach and put into practice community organizing and leadership skills. In addition, as social institutions they foster trusting networks both among youth, and between youth and other members of society. Finally, they provide religious organizations that focus on specific causes and/or issue groups, creating networks between church members (especially youth) and social causes (Smith 2003). In Korea’s case, these organizations were directly linked to the other major groups of protesters: students and labor. Significantly, the historical factionalism within the Protestant church created such a large ‘constellation of civil society organizations’ that the government struggled to exert total control over pro-democracy activity (Clark 2002: 181).

This form of autonomy played a particularly important role in shaping pro-democracy demonstrations. Due to heavy state repression, many other groups (students, labor, etc) could not access institutions free from the repressive state apparatus. While the Catholic church possessed the most autonomy, the Protestant church’s organizational structure also lent it to pro-democracy political activism. Historically, church leadership divided the country by region and assigned missions to each region, creating divisions between different mission societies as they developed identities that in part reflected their local areas as part of the broader indigenization of
Protestantism in Korea. They were influenced by the broader historical factions such as north versus south and political center versus the periphery. The shinto shrine worship controversy further stoked factionalism. The divisions were accentuated after the war because different groups – stoked by tensions from historical regional divisions, power changes among church leadership, and the Shinto shrine worship controversy – established their own separate denominations, including divisions among educational institutions. As a result, despite the Protestant church’s closeness to the government writ large, smaller units of the church had their own forms of autonomy from the larger church structure, and thus the state (Park and Pak 2011b).

Other historical events also helped create the dynamic in Korea where the church was unique in its role in facilitating social capital necessary for the pro-democracy movement during the crackdown in the 1970s. Despite the lack of generalized trust within Korea, church denominations created social spaces to develop trust. Moreover, after the war, most international relief was channeled through the church, imbuing it with legitimacy in local communities and creating networks of people.

The church was a uniquely important political organization. During the period of intense social and political regulation, the church not only provided the space, but also the training, for community action: ‘Koreans joined the Protestant church and practiced “Korean politics” … [the] church organization attracted politically active Koreans more than other forms did because it encouraged the participation of lay members in its pastor-elder sessions, presbyteries, and general assemblies’ (Park and Pak 2011b: 106). Because the church actively involved the working class, it thus disseminated community organizing skills and created networks between members of the working class and members of other sectors of society.
One illustration of the church’s ability to foster trust was the Rhee regime itself. Rhee’s government was solidly Christian. The US was only concerned with getting political leadership that opposed communism, and not specifically getting Christian leaders in charge. The fact that they favored Christians was merely corollary, as many Korean Christians’ were vehemently opposed to communism (Park and Pak 2011c). Moreover, the US government simply did not have the capacity to instill Christian leadership to the extent that it existed within the Rhee government. Rather, Rhee’s regime favored Christians due to its leadership’s foundation in the church. Because the authoritarian rulers could trust the people they knew from the church, they were able to put them in power and create an authoritarian regime that would not splinter internally. Again, the church as an institution created social networks and trust which spilled over to political organization.

**Church Relationships with Protesters**

**Students and Youth**

Students made up practically the entirety of the pro-democracy movement in its beginnings. The church’s relationship with students and youth influenced how the democracy movement grew, including how the church came to take up the cause in the mid-1970s. As mentioned earlier, the church provided unique organizational contexts that educated youth, trained them in skills like leadership, public speaking, and community organizing, and created social networks imbued with trust, thus laying important groundwork for the movement to later arise. Moreover, during the period of demonstration the church provided autonomy necessary to continue anti-government activity during a period of severe repression.

Beyond creating the organizational conditions within church activities, the church also created broader social conditions that helped give rise to youth social organization. It can
certainly be said that without the great contributions of the Protestant and Catholic churches in Korea, higher learning institutions in the country would not have been as numerous or as autonomous in the 1960s and 1970s. These ‘schools...and their alumni associations are civil society institutions… institutionalizing loyalties and obligations that are far beyond the control of the state’ (Clark 2002: 180).

Many of the church’s programs helped foster such social capital, preceding and during the movement. For example, the Ecumenical Youth Council (EYC) demonstrates how church-sponsored organizations fostered inter-religious coalitions among youth groups. The EYC is a great example of how the church's status made it subversive due to its autonomy, existing outside of traditional spaces of protest and legal status. Its creation was distinctly political; its mission was to ‘draw upon the potential power of students and youths while moving their activities away from the campuses to avoid restrictions set by ED number 4’ (Shin et al 2007: 37). Other examples of church organizations developing ties among youth and between youth and the church are the Korean Student Christian Federation, the YMCA, the Seoul District Youth Association of the Presbyterian Church, the Christian Church Youth Association, and the Intervarsity Christian Fellowship. Additionally, the church fostered social capital among young women, specifically with organizations such as the YWCA, Korean Coalition of Christian Women, and Korean Church Women United. This development helped broaden relational ties among politically active church members and increase political participation.

The youth social organization the churches fostered in turn spurred their direct involvement in the movement because they defended the students from government crackdown. For example, in 1975 the government demanded that Dr. Park Tae Sun step down from his post as the head of Yonsei University. This action caused church members to join in and support
protests by students, showing the link between the church and student groups in society. Indeed, Dr. Park expressed his gratitude toward the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Korea in New York ‘for all the spiritual and material support they have given us’ (quoted in Kang 1997a: 111).

Labor

Many of the church’s labor-associated groups expressed political purposes. For example, the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM), a unit of the Protestant National Christian Council, was expressly ‘aimed at protecting workers from abuse’ (Clark 2002: 177). These alliances helped the church funnel resources - particularly human capital - to the more political groups in the democracy movement. As with its relationship with student groups, the churches relationship with these organizations in turn caused them to become more politically involved in the protest movement due to the relational networks they created: ‘Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) ministers and church leaders first indirectly learned of the situation from the laborers themselves who attended their churches. They then obtained manual labor jobs in order to work alongside laborers and help them organize’ (Shin et al 2007: 35-36). This example shows how the networks formed within the church led to a broadening of the pro-democracy movement in the form of information dissemination and the church and its members getting more involved. Other examples of church organizations developing ties between labor and the church are the Seoul Metropolitan Community Organization, the ‘Street Learning Place,’ the Social Development Corps of Christian Students, and the Young Catholic Workers.

The Seoul Metropolitan Community Organization had close ties to the church and protested crackdowns on it, again demonstrating the societal web between the church and various social groups. This organization, designed to involve church members with lower class issues,
fostered the human capital necessary for later pro-democracy action because members ‘helped to organize the community in order to protect the rights of the poor’ (Kang 1997a: 114). This organization fostered ties with student groups as well because many Christian students joined the group. Thus, The Seoul Metropolitan Community Organization exemplifies the ways in which the Church’s organizational structure fostered inter-group solidarity and the human capital necessary for pro-democracy protest (Kang 1997a: 111-14).

Many of these associations with labor also created intersections with youth activists. Night schools exemplify this inter-group alliance building. For example, Hyunj Church ran a night school, called ‘Street Learning Place.’ With night schools, the church created organizational connections not only among students, but also laborers for whom night school was the only option for group organization, discussion, deliberation, and interaction. Moreover, this focus on education meant the church developed the labor movement’s human capital.

The Christian Academy is another example of how the church created organizational networks and invested in human capital. It was initially created to assist with reconstruction after the Korean War (with a specific focus on establishing educational and social programs), again demonstrating how the church developed social capital among Korean citizens who would later engage in the democracy movement. Moreover, as participation in the democracy movement began to include more labor activists, it focused on assisting citizens negatively affected by industrialization. Thus, the organization played the role of a support network during the protest movement, assisting other groups in their work through both boosting morale and organizational support. The director of the organization, Pak Kyongso, explained that the group ‘trained laborers, farmers, youth, women, and ministers in the church… [to] raise awareness about democracy for all groups in society’ (quoted in Chang 2015c: 95). This explicit political focus on
helping the disadvantaged groups calling for democracy shows how the church served as a training ground for grassroots organizing, instilling in and between various social groups not only skills but also contacts and networks.

*Societal Subversion: Public Awareness, News Media, and Peaceful Protest*

Beyond labor and youth, the church influenced grassroots organization via its role as a distinguished social institution. In the fight against the government, the church played a vital role in countering its propaganda war. Due to both churches’ strong association with anti-communism, the government lost its best weapon to use against its enemies: labeling them communists and arresting them on the grounds of national security. In addition to imbuing the movements with which it was associated with credibility, the church used this reputation to criticize the government and perform political activism in such a way that would gradually turn broader segments of society against the regime. Many of the subversive tactics the churches employed parallel those taken they took during the colonial period, when they provided a platform for nationalists to organize and criticize the colonial government.

The churches, as institutions, constituted vast informational networks that could be used to sway public opinion. As groups such as labor associated with and exerted influence on the policies of the churches, they could better politically mobilize. For example, the Christian Broadcasting system helped spread stories about repressive labor policies in order to build support for, and demystify the fear of, the labor movement (Chang 2015c: 95). Moreover, such informational networks established a human rights discourse that framed how people thought about the movement and expressed themselves against the regime.

The churches’ social capital formation, creating social relations and trust, in turn created informal informational networks that played this same role as the more official information
distribution networks. The Human Rights Mission ‘quickly became the central node in the Christian network that linked together a variety of other groups, thereby expanding the organizational infrastructure of Christian activism’ (Chang 2015c: 96). Moreover, it was due to ‘the Thursday Prayer Meeting, the Human Rights Mission, and other Christian organizations, such as the Association of Family Members of Prisoners of Conscience, that Christians were able to publicize the stories of political prisoners and state torture to the larger public,’ thus demystifying activists and eliminating fears propagated by the regime (Chang 2015c: 96).

Another tactic used by the church to change public opinion and give credibility to labor and youth activists was allowing the arrests of its members. Triggered by non-violent modes of protest by leaders in both churches, these arrests ‘led to solidarity among many protesting groups (who all coalesced around demanding the release of the church leaders) and broadening the base of the protest movement by winning the favor of many indifferent members of society who were horrified to see the arrests of these peaceful church leaders’ (Kang 1997b: 102). Equally important, these protests helped to further develop social capital because, as exemplified in the case of the arrest of Bishop Daniel Chi, ‘all Catholics automatically became involved… we got much educating done at the almost biweekly prayer meetings. In church is where most Koreans learned… about their government’ (Father James Sinnott, quoted in Kang 1997b: 102). These prayer meetings involved testimonies from political prisoners and the distribution of the Human Rights Committee’s Human Rights Newsletter, helping educate members about various groups involved in the movement. Thus, with each arrest, the church provided a base of organizational networks to coordinate a public pressure campaign to protest the arrests. Moreover, due to the degree of inter-denominational autonomy within the church, the government struggled to prevent local communities which had organized in their churches from then mobilizing after these arrests.
in the form of prayer meetings and taking part in the vast organizational networks connecting the church to labor and youth.

An important aspect of this subversion is the physical capital the churches provided. The government could not attack worshipers in the same way it attacked student or working-class protesters in the streets. Under the guise of, or in tandem with, religious worship, church members could attack the government despite its severe repression. Due to their being powerful institutions, the churches provided physical space for other activist groups to meet and organize, as well as develop more substantive alliances with other anti-government groups (Park and Pak 2011c: 192). Moreover, many churches and cathedrals, most notably the Myŏngdong Cathedral, served as physical sanctuaries for protestors fleeing police violence. Thus, beyond direct contact with students and workers, the churches helped foster anti-government political action due to their institutional structures and resulting influence on social relations and information.

DISCUSSION

The Christian churches, both Protestant and Catholic, played pivotal, changing roles throughout the movement. In the mid-1970s, the churches took up the pro-democracy fight when the state began to effectively repress the student movement; by the late 1970s, the churches then stepped back from this role as the visible face of the movement as it diversified.

However, in addition to this more visible role making declarations during the 1970s, the churches played a substantive role as a support network that helped lay the conditions for, as well as greatly assist other groups in, protest. The churches were never the most powerful anti-governmental force; after all, only a small portion of the Protestant church participated, and the Catholic church alone did not have the capacity to exert enough pressure on the regime. In terms of anti-government action, the churches alone were extremely limited as one large unified
institution of Korean society, but their organizational structure helped to facilitate a much broader, if weaker, effect promoting the democracy movement at a time when the government was succeeding in stamping out the other manifestations of protest.

Thus, despite this broader failure to engage in pro-democratic activism, the churches made a positive impact on the movement because they fostered social capital, creating networks among people, emphasizing civic engagement, and building trust. This dynamic helped shape who the protesters were and how they organized. Moreover, these networks spilled over to connect components of the movement and protect them during periods of harsh state repression, keeping the movement alive and laying the groundwork for its diversification. More specifically, they fostered conditions that helped give rise to the student protest preceding their involvement, then helped protect students as the government responded. They also helped develop other groups of activists, such as labor, and foster intergroup alliances to strengthen the democracy movement. Finally, they broadened the movement’s message and helped anti-government groups earn society’s trust, creating the conditions for broader public involvement.

Church-created social networks kept the protest movement alive when a crackdown could have otherwise extinguished public activism. In addition, they created ways to keep other societal groups involved such that they could continue their fight. These groups then went on to exert more pressure in the late 1970s and 1980s after surviving the introduction of the Yusin government thanks to the churches. This web of church organizations and informal relations thus played an important role in the democracy movement from a more informal, grassroots level.
References


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