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Searching for Effective Teachers with Imperfect Information

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Teaching may be the most-scrutinized occupation in the economy. Over the past four decades, empirical researchers—many of them economists—have accumulated an impressive amount of evidence on teachers: the heterogeneity in teacher productivity, the rise in productivity associated with teaching credentials and on-the-job experience, rates of turnover, the costs of recruitment, the relationship between supply and quality, the effect of class size and the monetary value of academic achievement gains over a student’s lifetime. Since the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act, along with a number of state-level educational initiatives, the data needed to estimate individual teacher performance based on student achievement gains have become more widely available. However, there have been relatively few efforts to examine the implications of this voluminous literature on teacher performance. In this paper, we ask what the existing evidence implies for how school leaders might recruit, evaluate, and retain teachers.

We begin by summarizing the evidence on five key points, referring to existing work and to evidence we have accumulated from our research with the nation’s two largest school districts: Los Angeles and New York City. First, teachers display considerable heterogeneity in their effects on student achievement gains. The standard deviation across teachers in their impact on student achievement gains is on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 student-level standard deviations, which would improve the median student’s test score 4 to 8 percentiles in a single year.1 Second,
estimates of teacher effectiveness based on student achievement data are noisy measures and can be thought of as having reliability in the range of 30 to 50 percent. Third, teachers’ effectiveness rises rapidly in the first year or two of their teaching careers but then quickly levels out. Fourth, the primary cost of teacher turnover is not the direct cost of hiring and firing, but rather is the loss to students who will be taught by a novice teacher rather than one with several years of experience. Fifth, it is difficult to identify those teachers who will prove more effective at the time of hire. As a result, better teachers can only be identified after some evidence on their actual job performance has accumulated.

We then explore what these facts imply for how principals and school districts should act, using a simple model in which schools must search for teachers using noisy signals of teacher effectiveness. Due to a lack of information available at the time of hire, we will argue for a hiring process that is not highly selective—that is, while it might require evidence of general educational achievement like a college degree, it would not require individuals to make costly up-front specific investments before being permitted to teach. We then argue that, given the substantial observed heterogeneity of teacher effects, the modest rise in productivity with on-the-job experience, and the fact that tenure is a lifetime job, tenure protections should be limited to those who meet a very high bar. Even with the imprecise estimates of teacher effectiveness currently available, our simulations suggest that a strategy that would sample extensively from the pool of potential teachers but offer tenure only to a small percentage could yield substantial annual gains in student achievement.

The implications of our analysis are strikingly different from current practice. Schools and school districts attempt to screen at the point of hiring and require significant investment in education-specific coursework but then grant tenure status to teachers as a matter of course after two to three years on the job. Performance evaluation is typically a perfunctory exercise and, at least officially, very few teachers are considered ineffective (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, and Keeling, 2009). Rather than screening at the time of hire, the evidence on heterogeneity of teacher performance suggests a better strategy would be identifying large differences between

unversed in this literature, the gap in achievement between poor and nonpoor students (or between black and white students) in the United States is roughly 0.8–0.9 standard deviations (authors’ calculations based on data from the 2009 National Assessment of Educational Progress).
teachers by observing the first few years of teaching performance and retaining only the highest-performing teachers.

**Five Facts about Teacher Effectiveness**

Any approach to recruiting and retaining teachers is based, at least implicitly, on a set of beliefs. Here, we describe the evidence on five key parameters regarding teacher effectiveness.

**Fact 1: Teacher Productivity Based on Gains in Student Achievement is Heterogeneous.**

The fact that teachers are heterogeneous in their productivity suggests that there are potentially large gains to students if it is possible for school leaders to attract and retain highly effective teachers, and conversely to discourage or at least to avoid giving tenure to ineffective teachers.

More than three decades ago, Hanushek (1971) and Murnane (1975) were the first economists to report large differences in student achievement in different teachers’ classrooms, even after controlling for students’ prior achievement and characteristics. That literature has accelerated in recent years. Especially following the No Child Left Behind Act, many states and school districts began collecting annual data on students and matching it to teachers.² Research has produced remarkably consistent estimates of the heterogeneity in teacher impacts in different sites. For example, using data from Texas, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) find that a standard deviation in teacher quality is associated with 0.11 student-level standard deviations in math and 0.095 standard deviations in reading. Using data from two school districts in New Jersey, Rockoff (2004) reports that one standard deviation in teacher effects is associated with a

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² The data requirements for measuring heterogeneity in teaching effectiveness are high. First, one needs longitudinal data on achievement for individual students matched to specific teachers. Second, achievement data are needed on an annual basis to be able to track gains for each student over a single school year. (Prior to the No Child Left Behind legislation, many states tested at longer intervals, such as fourth and eighth grade.) Third, panel data on teachers are required as well, to be able to track performance of individual teachers over time. Teacher-level panel data are needed to account for school-level or classroom-level shocks to student achievement that contribute to the measurement error in classroom-level measures. In this journal, Kane and Staiger (2002) showed that conventional estimates of sampling error cannot account for the lack of persistence in school-level value-added estimates. There appear to be other school-level and classroom-level sources of error.
0.1 student-level standard deviation in achievement. Using data from Chicago, Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) report that a standard deviation in teacher quality is associated with a difference in math performance of 0.09 to 0.16 student-level standard deviations.\footnote{Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) report the variance in teacher quality to be .02 to .06 grade-level equivalents (adjusted for sampling error). In table 1, they report the standard deviation in grade-level equivalents of 8th grade students to be 1.55 ($\sqrt{.02 / 155} = .09$, $\sqrt{.06 / 155} = .16$). Their study adjusted for sampling variation, but not for other classroom level sources of error.}

How much should we care about these differences in effectiveness across teachers? To attach an approximate dollar value to them, one needs an estimate of the value of student achievement over the course of a student’s lifetime. There is a long tradition in labor economics estimating the relationship between various types of test scores and the earnings of early-career workers (for example, Murnane, Willett, and Levy, 1995; Neal and Johnson, 1996).\footnote{Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) estimate that a one standard deviation difference in math test performance is associated with an 8 percent hourly wage increase for men and a 12.6 percent increase in for women. These estimates may underestimate the value of academic achievement since the authors also control for years of schooling completed. Neal and Johnson (1996), who do not condition on educational attainment, estimate that an improvement of one standard deviation in test performance is associated with 18.7 and 25.6 percent increases in hourly wages for men and women, respectively. Of course, the cross-sectional relationship between test achievement and earnings may overstate the causal value of academic achievement. However, while there have been attempts to estimate the causal value of years of schooling, we are not aware of estimates of the causal value of academic achievement.} Kane and Staiger (2002) estimated that the value of a one standard deviation gain in math scores would have been worth $110,000 at age 18 using the Murnane et al. estimates, and $256,000 using the Neal and Johnson results. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in teacher effectiveness (that is, one that leads to an increase of about 0.15 standard deviations of student achievement for 20 students) has a value of around $330,000 to $760,000.

As several recent papers remind us, the statistical assumptions required for the identification of causal teacher effects with observational data are extraordinarily strong and rarely tested (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, and Zajonc, 2009; McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, and Hamilton, 2004; Raudenbush, 2004; Rothstein, 2010; Rubin, Stuart, and Zanutto, 2004; Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Teachers may be assigned classrooms of students that differ in unmeasured ways—such as consisting of more motivated students, or students with stronger...
unmeasured prior achievement or more engaged parents—that result in varying student achievement gains.

Despite these concerns, several pieces of evidence suggest that the magnitude of variation in teacher effects is driven by real differences in teacher quality. First, estimates tend to be highly correlated across a wide variety of specifications (Harris and Sass, 2006). Second, researchers have consistently found strong correlations between teacher effect estimates and evaluations made by school principals and other professional educators (Murnane, 1975; Jacob and Lefgren, 2008; Harris and Sass, 2009; Rockoff and Speroni, 2010; Tyler, Taylor, Kane, and Wooten, 2010). Third, while most studies of teacher effects rely on assumptions regarding matching of students with teachers at the classroom level, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) use a completely different approach that does not rely on this assumption and find similar estimates to the rest of the literature.

Finally, two studies based on random assignment of teachers to classrooms have found variation in teacher effects consistent with nonexperimental estimates, suggesting that estimated differences in teacher effectiveness are not driven by student sorting. Nye, Konstantopoulos, and Hedges (2004) reexamined data from the Tennessee STAR classroom size experiment, in which teachers were randomly assigned to classes of a given size. The differences in classroom-level student achievement that emerged within given class size groups were larger than would have been expected to occur due to chance and strikingly similar in magnitude to those estimated in nonexperimental studies. Kane and Staiger (2008) study a recent experiment in Los Angeles Unified School District in which pairs of teachers were randomly assigned to classrooms within the same elementary school and grade. They found that nonexperimental value-added estimates from a pre-experimental period were able to predict student achievement differences following random assignment: a one-point difference between randomly-assigned teachers in pre-experimental value added was associated with a one-point difference in student achievement following random assignment. Thus, the nonexperimental estimates for individual teachers were unbiased predictors of a teacher’s impact on student achievement in the experiment.

**Fact 2: Estimates of Heterogeneous Teacher Effects Include a Substantial Noise Component.**
Ideally, estimates of the amount that teachers affect student achievement would be the same across classrooms or from year to year within the same teacher, but this does not hold true in practice. The error in estimates of teacher effects on student achievement derives from at least two sources. The first is sampling variation. The typical elementary classroom may have 20 to 25 students per year (although middle and high school teachers have somewhat larger classes and typically teach multiple sections). With samples of such modest size, naturally occurring variation in the make-up of a teacher’s classroom from year to year will produce variation in a teacher’s estimated effect. However, volatility in teacher (and school) effects exceeds that predicted by sampling error alone (Kane and Staiger, 2002; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger, 2008).

The source of this second type of error—which can perhaps more accurately be thought of as nonpersistent variation in estimates of teacher effects on student achievement—could include a broad range of factors influencing the measured achievement gains of groups of students: for example, interactions between a specific teacher’s lesson plans and the test used in a given year, an (unpredictably) disruptive student that drags down his/her classmates, a dog-barking in the parking lot on the day of the test, or more mysterious forces that fall under the broad category of “classroom chemistry.”

For present purposes, any nonpersistent variation in a teacher’s measured impact on student achievement represents estimation error. One approach to estimating the proportion of variance due to nonpersistent sources is to study the correlation in estimated impacts across classrooms taught by the same teacher. If a teacher’s estimated impact, \( Y_t \), represents the sum of a persistent component, \( \mu_t \), and an uncorrelated nonpersistent error, \( \varepsilon_t \), then the correlation between the estimated effect this year and last year—that is, between \( Y_t \) and \( Y_{t-1} \)—represents an estimate of the reliability of the teacher-level estimate in any given year. Table 1 reports the standard deviation in estimated teacher effects, the estimated reliability (as measured by the correlation across classrooms taught by the same teacher), and implied standard deviation in true teacher impacts (\( \sigma_{\mu} \)) for teachers in two school districts: Los Angeles Unified and New York City. When reported in terms of the student-level standard deviation in test scores in a given grade and subject, the standard deviation in estimated value added for teachers was remarkably similar in the two districts, with estimates in both math and English Language Arts in the narrow range from .23 to .27. Although the estimated reliability of teacher effects was higher in math than in English Language Arts, and higher in Los Angeles than in New York City, all the
reliability estimates suggest that there is considerable error or volatility in the teacher impact estimates. Indeed, more than half of the variation in estimated impacts in math and English Language Arts are nonpersistent. The standard deviation of the persistent teacher effect is between .12 and .19, similar to that found in the previous literature discussed above.

**Fact 3: Teachers Improve Substantially in Their First Few Years on the Job.**

Table 1 also reports the degree to which average teacher effects on student achievement differ from that of experienced teachers during the first few years on the job in these same two districts. In both Los Angeles and New York, teacher effects on student achievement appear to rise rapidly during the first several years on the job and then flatten out. This finding has been replicated in a number of states and districts (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, 2006; Harris and Sass, 2006; Jacob, 2007). When assigned to a first-year teacher, the average student gains .06 to .08 standard deviations of achievement less than observably similar students assigned to experienced teachers. However, the achievement gains of students assigned to second-year teachers lagged those in more experienced teachers’ classrooms by only .01 to .04 standard deviations. In Los Angeles, students of third-year teachers saw gains comparable to those of more experienced teachers, while there was a small difference for third-year teachers in New York (.01 to .02 standard deviations).

**Fact 4: The Main Cost of Teacher Turnover is the Reduction in Student Achievement when an Experienced Teacher is Replaced by a Novice, not Direct Hiring Costs.**

Milanowski and Odden (2007) carefully studied costs of teacher recruitment and hiring in a large urban Midwestern school district. They estimate total costs of roughly $8,200: recruiting costs per vacancy of $1,100 in central office staff time and $2,600 in school-level staff time, plus $4,500 for the cost of training a new teacher. In addition, some of these costs will be defrayed by the salaries earned by new teachers, which are typically lower than the salaries of the teachers they replace.

Based on the gains that teachers make in their first few years of experience, every time a school district loses an experienced teacher with two or more years of experience and is forced to hire a novice teacher, the students assigned to the novice teacher over the first two years of their career lose roughly .10 standard deviations in student achievement. As discussed above,
estimates suggest a .10 standard deviation gain in math scores has a value of roughly $10,000 to $25,000 per student. Thus, the economic cost of lost academic achievement when replacing an experienced elementary teacher with a novice would be roughly $10,000 to $25,000 times 20 students per class—or $200,000 to $500,000. This is obviously a back-of-the-envelope calculation, but it dwarfs the direct costs of teacher hiring.

Fact 5: School Leaders Have Very Little Ability to Select Effective Teachers During the Initial Hiring Process.

Reliable screening at the hiring stage would be an efficient tool for raising student achievement because it avoids the cost of placing ineffective teachers in front of students. Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that school districts or principals can effectively separate effective and ineffective teachers when they make hiring decisions. Indeed, this notion is supported by the fact that most of the variation in teacher effects occurs among teachers hired into the same school.

One of the most interesting pieces of evidence on this topic comes from a natural experiment which occurred in California in the late 1990s (Kane and Staiger, 2005). Beginning in the academic year 1996–1997, the state of California provided cash incentives to school districts to keep class sizes in kindergarten through third grade to a maximum of 20 children. To take advantage of the state incentive, school districts throughout the state dramatically increased hiring of new elementary teachers. In the years before 1997, Los Angeles Unified School District hired 1,200 to 1,400 elementary school teachers per year, but in 1997 Los Angeles nearly tripled the number of elementary school teachers it hired, to 3,335, and continued to hire at more than double its earlier level for the next five years.

If the district were able to discern teacher effectiveness in the hiring process, we would have expected a large increase in hiring to have had a negative effect on the average effectiveness of the teachers hired. Such an effect would likely have been heightened by the fact that nearly every other school district in California was on a hiring spree because of the same state law, the fact that teacher compensation in Los Angeles did not increase more than usual during this period, and that the proportion of new hires in L.A. without teaching credentials rose
from 59 percent to 72 percent.\textsuperscript{5} However, Kane and Staiger (2005) find that, despite the size of the hiring bubble, value added in the period 2001–2004 for teachers hired in 1997 was no worse than for teachers hired in the years immediately before 1997.\textsuperscript{6} Overall, there was no evidence that tripling the number of new hires had any effect on their average effectiveness in the classroom.\textsuperscript{7}

Other evidence on this issue comes from decades of work in which researchers have tried, unsuccessfully, to link teacher characteristics observable to both researchers and principals to student outcomes (see reviews by Hanushek, 1986, 1997; Jacob, 2007). With the exception of teaching experience, there is little to suggest that the credentials commonly used to determine teacher certification and pay are related to teachers’ impacts on student outcomes. Some studies find that a teacher’s academic background (like college grade point average or SAT test scores) is related to student outcomes, but Ballou (1996) finds that teaching applicants with strong academic records are no more likely to be hired by school principals.

More recent work suggests that selecting teaching candidates who are likely to be effective is difficult, but not impossible. For example, several studies have estimated the effect of novice teachers recruited under the Teach for America program (Decker, Mayer, and Glazerman, 2004; Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2006; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger, 2008). Teach for America is highly selective, drawing applicants from the top universities in the country and offering positions to only a small fraction of the thousands of individuals who apply. However, these applicants have not generally taken college courses in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{5} It may seem surprising that the fraction of teachers without credentials didn’t rise by more, but the number of individuals with teaching certification that do not teach is quite large. Data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond study indicate that roughly one in five college graduates receive teaching certification in the ten years after graduation, but 45 percent of college graduates that obtained teaching certification are not teaching, and 15 percent have never taught (author’s calculations using National Center for Education Statistics QuickStats on 6/8/2010).
\item \textsuperscript{6} Their analysis focuses on grades two through five in Los Angeles from 2001 through 2004. By 2001, roughly two-thirds of both the 1996 and 1997 hiring cohorts were still employed by the district; thus, there is little evidence to suggest any differential selective attrition for the larger cohort. Also, while their value-added model controls for baseline scores and other student characteristics, there was virtually no difference in the types of students to which the cohorts had been assigned.
\item \textsuperscript{7} This evidence runs counter to the prevailing wisdom among some policy analysts that it was a decline in the average quality of the teaching force that accounts for the failure to see an increase in achievement in California resulting from the class size reduction (Bohrnstedt and Stecher, 2002).
\end{itemize}
K–12 education nor have they majored in education. Decker, Mayer, and Glazerman (2004) use random assignment to estimate the effect of the program in elementary schools and find that students assigned to Teach For America members scored 2 percentile points (0.095 standard deviations) higher in math and no higher in reading than those assigned to other teachers. Using nonexperimental data from New York City, in Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008), we find positive effects of Teach For America teachers in math of .02 standard deviations and no statistically significant effect in English Language Arts. Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006) report comparable results, also using data from New York City.

More evidence comes from studies collecting data on recently-hired novice math teachers in New York City. In Rockoff, Jacob, Kane, and Staiger (forthcoming), we collected information on a number of nontraditional predictors of effectiveness—including teaching-specific content knowledge, cognitive ability, personality traits, feelings of self-efficacy, and scores on a commercially available teacher selection instrument—and then used these to predict a teacher’s effect on math achievement. When the variables were combined into two primary factors summarizing cognitive and noncognitive skills, teachers who were one standard deviation higher on either the cognitive or noncognitive factor were found to raise student achievement in math by .033 student-level standard deviations more than teachers with average skill levels. Those who were one standard deviation higher on both measures were estimated to raise achievement by .066 standard deviations. Rockoff and Speroni (2010) examined the achievement of students assigned to teachers recruited through an alternative certification program—the New York City Teaching Fellows—and asked whether achievement gains were higher for students assigned to teachers rated as more attractive candidates by the certification program’s interview protocol. They found no significant relationship with English Language Arts test scores and a small positive relationship with math test scores: a one standard deviation in interview score was associated with .013 standard deviations higher math achievement gain.

**Implications for How We Should (and Should Not) Search for Effective Teachers**

Here, we first lay out a way of thinking about the appropriate search strategy for school leaders based on these empirical findings. Based on this approach, we then present simulation estimates of how these different strategies would affect average teacher productivity.
A Reservation Value or Cut-off Score Model

Suppose that school districts do not observe any useful pre-hire signal—there are a substantial number of potential applicants for teaching jobs who appear to have the general skill level to succeed in teaching, but we cannot tell in advance which ones will actually succeed. However, after teachers accept a job, the school can observe the gains that students make in test scores. Thus, the principal faces a search problem: the principal draws teachers from the applicant pool, observes noisy signals over time about teacher productivity, and decides whether to dismiss unproductive teachers and start the process over again. In this kind of model, the optimal decision rule has a reservation property: at the end of a year, the principal makes a decision on whether to dismiss a teacher if the expected effectiveness of that teacher, given the information to date, lies below a reservation value.\(^8\)

At a broad level, the principal should set the cut-off score where the productivity of the \textit{marginal} teacher is expected to be equal to the productivity of the \textit{average} teacher. In other words, this decision rule tells principals to keep only the rookies who are expected to be better than the average teacher. Imagine if this were not true—that is, suppose the marginal teacher were less productive than the average teacher. Then the school district could raise average performance by raising its standard for new hires by a small amount. Likewise, if the marginal teacher accepted under the standard were more productive than the average teacher, then the district could raise average performance by lowering the cut-off score for new hires and adding one more above-average teacher. This result is analogous to the usual result that average costs are minimized at the point where marginal cost equals average cost.

However, determining the reservation value or cut-off score in practice will be complex. The optimal reservation value depends on a set of underlying parameters similar to those already discussed: the extent of variation in performance across teachers, the return to experience, the number of years before tenure, the exogenous turnover rate, the size of the applicant pool, and the magnitude of other hiring and firing costs. For example, if teachers are more heterogeneous, then the potential benefits of greater selection are higher. However, if there is more noise (and thus uncertainty) in the estimates of teacher heterogeneity, then the benefits of selection are

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\(^8\) For a simple algebraic presentation of this model, with some discussion of its links to search models with imperfect information in labor markets, see the online appendix available with this paper at <http://www.e-jep.org>.
lower. If the gains from teacher experience are worth more, then the cost of dismissing experienced teachers and replacing them with novices is larger. If the exogenous turnover rate of teachers is high, then the optimal cut-off for tenure falls because there is less benefit to giving tenure to highly effective teachers if they do not stay long. Overall, the principal must set the bar to trade off the short-term cost of replacing an experienced teacher with a rookie against the long-term benefit of selecting only the most effective teachers.

In what follows, we report the results of Monte Carlo simulations that examine the consequences of different approaches to teacher evaluation and retention. We use evidence on key underlying parameters to calibrate the model; all of these values lie in the middle of the estimates reported for Los Angeles and New York City in Table 1. We set the standard deviation of the persistent teacher effect (in student-level standard deviation units) equal to 0.15, and the reliability of the value-added measure (the ratio of the persistent variance to total variance) equal to 40 percent. For the return to experience, we assume that a first- and second-year teacher’s value added is –0.07 and –0.02 student standard deviations below the value added of teachers in their third year or higher. We ignore the direct costs of hiring a new teacher. Finally, we assume a maximum teaching career of 30 years and an exogenous turnover rate of 5 percent, which is approximately the proportion of experienced teachers who leave the Los Angeles and New York City districts each year.

Tenure or Dismiss after One Year

We begin with a basic example in which the principal must either dismiss or tenure a teacher after one year of teaching based on just one year of student value-added data. Figure 1 reports the expected steady-state impact of dismissing a given proportion of teachers (the bottom axis) on value added of the average teacher (left axis, solid line) and on the proportion of the teacher workforce who are in their first year of teaching (right axis, dashed line).

The implications of Figure 1 are stark. First, the simulation suggests there are substantial gains from using value-added information to dismiss ineffective teachers and that the principal should set a very high bar for tenure. To maximize average value added, about 80 percent of teachers should be dismissed after their first year. This aggressive strategy would raise the average value added of teachers in the school to just over 0.08; put differently, the effectiveness of the average teacher (including the rookies) would be greater than roughly 70 percent of the
tenured teachers under the old system. Moreover, it is not the case that most of the gain comes from dismissing the very lowest-performing teachers. Indeed, until the principal reaches the optimum, the gain to being increasingly selective in who receives tenure is roughly linear. For example, if the principal dismissed the 40 percent of first-year teachers with the lowest value added, rather than 80 percent, the average value added among teachers in the school would increase by roughly 0.045 in the long run.

While these results are surprising relative to current practice, there are a number of clear reasons why principals might choose to dismiss a large proportion of novice teachers. Even unreliable performance measures such as value added can identify substantial and lasting differences across teachers. Differences in teacher effects are large and persistent relative to the short-lived costs of hiring a new teacher. Since the typical teacher getting tenure will teach for ten years or more, the benefit from setting a high tenure bar will be large. Of course, such unreliable measures make mistakes. But the long-run cost of retaining an ineffective teacher far outweighs the short-run cost of dismissing an effective teacher. Moreover, because of the uncertainty at the time of hire, new teachers have considerable option value; for every five new hires, one will be identified as a highly effective teacher and provide many years of valuable service.

There are many reasons why these simulations could overstate the benefits or understate the costs of such an aggressive tenure policy, and we have tried to enumerate a number of them here. In general, for reasonable variations in the parameter values, these issues do not alter our qualitative conclusions.

First, we may have understated the hiring and firing costs facing a principal. As we discussed earlier, the main cost of turnover is the lower effectiveness of new teachers, which corresponds to a cost of well over $100,000 in terms of foregone future student earnings. However, even if we double the difference in value added between rookies and experienced teachers (that is, from 0.07 to .14 student level standard deviations), the optimal dismissal rate remains over 75 percent.

Second, we may have understated turnover rates among tenured teachers, especially if principals focus on their own school (rather than the district as a whole) and highly effective teachers are more likely to move to other schools. Similarly, principals may discount the future more highly because of their own likelihood of leaving the school, or because they believe that
teacher effects will not persist into the future (although the evidence suggests otherwise). However, if we double the exogenous annual turnover rate from 5 to 10 percent, the optimal dismissal rate remains over 70 percent.

Third, we may have understated the cost of recruiting teachers. The simulation indicates that a dismissal rate of 80 percent would result in more than 20 percent of the workforce being novice teachers at any time, more than double the current proportion of novices in Los Angeles and New York City. Districts would have to hire many more teachers to accommodate this strategy, and these new hires would presumably demand higher wages to compensate for the substantial risk of being dismissed. This is particularly true if we continue to require costly up-front teaching-specific training. However, even a doubling of current teacher salaries would not be enough to offset the benefits of an aggressive dismissal policy, since a .08 annual increase in student achievement is worth more than $100,000 per teacher.

Fourth, our simulations focus on the steady state, and we have ignored what happens along the way. This may be important if we discount the earnings of future children relative to current children. Specifically, for a school that starts with all new teachers, an aggressive dismissal policy will result in high fractions of inexperienced teachers in the short run even if the equilibrium percentage of rookies is lower. For example, if we compare a policy of retaining the top 20 percent of new teachers with retaining 90 percent, average teacher effectiveness would be slightly lower in the first two years after implementing the more aggressive policy, turn positive in year three, and approach the steady state gains after roughly ten years. Nevertheless, we find the optimal dismissal rate is still above 70 percent for annual discount rates in a reasonable range (say 2 to 8 percent), and falls to 50 percent only with annual discount rates on the order of 15 percent.

Fifth, there may be spillover effects in teaching, where good teachers help raise the achievement of their colleagues students (Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009; Koedell, forthcoming). This has two offsetting effects in the context of our analysis. Spillover effects imply that our estimate of the variation in how teachers impact their own students is overstated (because some of the observed effect is due to their colleagues). However, if this bias is roughly 20 percent, as suggested by Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), so that the true standard deviation in persistent teacher effects was 0.12 rather than 0.15, the optimal dismissal rate would still be 79 percent in
our model. Moreover, spillover effects will also increase the benefits of filling schools entirely with highly effective teachers and could easily imply higher optimal dismissal rates.

Sixth, we have assumed that teachers who do not receive tenure exit the teaching workforce. If teaching effectiveness is measured with error and principals have no power to screen among candidates, then dismissed teachers could move to another school and hope for better luck in their evaluation. If this occurred, the average quality of the applicant pool would decline. This type of phenomenon—poorly performing teachers moving to new schools, typically those serving more disadvantaged students (discussed in Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2008)—is already well-known in education, and is referred to as “the dance of the lemons.” This suggests that principals could benefit their colleagues at other schools by sharing performance information on teachers. However, if schools were highly selective in granting tenure, it might also be true that teachers who receive a bad signal regarding their effectiveness would have less incentive to “shop around.”

Seventh, there is evidence that the impact of a teacher on the achievement of current students may fade out over time as those students progress through their remaining years of school (Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims, 2008; Kane and Staiger, 2008). It is unclear whether this greatly weakens the case for raising teacher quality. We do not know whether fadeout is a general phenomenon or whether it is a result of current levels of heterogeneity in teacher effectiveness. For example, having a highly effective teacher in the previous year may do a student little good if they are placed with a highly ineffective teacher this year, or if their classmates were placed with a highly ineffective teacher the previous year. In other words, teacher effects might not fade out if a group of students is given a sequence of highly effective teachers. Moreover, raising a student’s academic achievement as measured in a particular grade may still be valuable even if the student’s score in later grade levels do not remain at the

\[9\] A similar complication arises if teaching skills are partially related to subject matter, grade level, or the teacher–school match. The evidence on the specificity of teaching skill is mixed (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2008; Lockwood and McCaffrey, 2009; Jackson, 2010), but it is reasonable to believe that, say, a mediocre teacher of high school physics in Harlem may have made a good fifth grade math teacher in Brooklyn Heights, or vice versa. If principals do have access to information on the past performance of teachers who did not make tenure, specificity in skill can simply be interpreted as an additional source of error. This may lead principals to be more willing to “take a chance” on a teacher who just missed tenure by trying them in a different subject, grade, or teaching environment.
improved level. For instance, a better knowledge of numerical operations may still be valuable in the labor market even if it does not lead to better test scores in algebra. Nevertheless, we do view “fade-out” as a primary empirical issue, not just in studies of teachers, but in studies of educational interventions more broadly (for example, Currie and Thomas, 1995).

Finally, we may have overstated the reliability of value-added measures. We address this issue in considerable detail below. However, even if we cut the reliability of value added in half (from 40 to 20 percent), the optimal dismissal rate remains over 70 percent.

The Effect of Changing the Time to Tenure Review

In our next set of simulations, we evaluate how changing the time until tenure review affects the optimal dismissal rate and the average value added of teachers. The first column of Table 2 repeats the results from our benchmark simulations in which dismissal could only occur at the end of the first year. The next three columns allow the principal to delay tenure review until the second, third, or fourth year, and to gather more information about teacher effectiveness before making a decision regarding dismissal. The next three columns require a delay in tenure review for 2 to 4 years, so that dismissal can occur only after multiple years of value-added data are available to the principal.

Not surprisingly, giving a principal the option of waiting to gather more information produces some benefits. Average value added rises to about 0.10 standard deviations with the possibility of delaying tenure review to the fourth year, with most of the gain coming from delaying tenure until the second year. Even with the option to delay the tenure decision, the principal would still dismiss two-thirds of new hires after the first year, but would wait to dismiss some teachers for whom there is a reasonable chance that an additional year of data could lead to a better decision. Intuitively, the cut-off score for dismissing a new teacher rises with time on the job, because the option value of waiting to dismiss a teacher declines as the principal accumulates better information. In other words, to avoid unnecessary turnover the principal may choose to wait a year before dismissing a teacher who the principal believes is “below the bar” so long as there is a reasonable chance that this evaluation could change. Thus, the principal dismisses teachers whose expected effectiveness lies below a bar that increases with teacher experience. Overall dismissal rates do not change much as the principal is allowed to
wait until year 2, 3, or 4 to make a decision, but the extra time allows the principal to better identify the remaining subset of teachers for tenure.

In contrast, requiring principals to delay tenure review—that is, removing the option of dismissal until year 2, 3, or 4—would lead to lower average teacher value added, relative to the baseline case. Essentially, this policy forces principals to retain low-performing teachers additional years, and this outweighs the benefits of the additional information the principal would obtain by waiting to see additional years of performance data. Note that this policy also leads to fewer teachers being dismissed overall, since the option value of hiring a new teacher (who may turn out to be ineffective and must be retained for several years) has fallen.

**Obtaining More Reliable Information at the Time of Hire**

We have assumed that principals have no useful information at the time of hire. This implies that radical increases in hiring rates (as required by a dismissal rate of 80 percent) do not affect the quality of new hires—each individual is a random draw from a generally qualified applicant pool. But many districts and principals put substantial effort into screening and interviewing new hires, suggesting that even small amounts of information at the time of hire may be valuable.

Figure 2 shows how changing the reliability of the pre-hire signal affects the optimal dismissal rate (right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the school (left axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only dismiss teachers after the first year ($T = 1$). We also assumed that the pool of potential applicants was ten times the number needed to replace teachers leaving through exogenous turnover, corresponding to estimates that New York City and Los Angeles currently have about 10 applicants for each position. Our baseline simulation corresponds to a reliability of 0 in the pre-hire signal, at the far left in this figure.

Figure 2 suggests that pre-hire information on teacher effectiveness is potentially quite valuable. Compared to having no information at the time of hire, a perfect pre-hire signal with 100 percent reliability would nearly triple the gain to the value added of the teacher workforce, and of course would eliminate the need to dismiss teachers after hire. More interestingly, even a low reliability signal of 20 percent at the time of hire doubles the gain to the value added of the teacher workforce relative to the benchmark case with no pre-hire information. However, access
to a pre-hire signal does not eliminate the need to dismiss additional teachers after hire. As long as there is remaining uncertainty about teacher effectiveness among the teachers that are hired, there will be a benefit to dismissing additional teachers after observing classroom performance.

**Obtaining More Reliable Measures of On-the-Job Performance**

Figure 3 shows how changing the reliability of the on-the-job signal affects the optimal timing of tenure (regions delineated by dotted lines, labeled at top), the optimal dismissal rate (right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the school (left axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only dismiss teachers at tenure time ($T$).

Many school districts are currently engaged in efforts to improve the reliability with which they can measure teacher performance, through the use of additional information from classroom observation, student work, and student or parent surveys. Figure 3 suggests that more reliable measures of teacher performance are quite valuable. Relative to our baseline simulation, in which the reliability of the annual performance measure was 40 percent (.4 in the figure), a measure with perfect reliability would nearly double the gains from selecting effective teachers (to 0.14 standard deviations) while having little impact on the proportion of teachers dismissed. If districts relied on performance measures that were less reliable than our baseline case, the gains from selecting effective teachers would be reduced, and it would become optimal for the principal to wait longer before dismissing a teacher. Interestingly, the proportion of teachers dismissed does not decline much until the reliability of the performance measure drops below 5 percent (.05 in the figure). Even very weak signals of teacher performance eventually identify differences between teachers that make the benefits of selectively awarding tenure swamp the cost of having to hire additional inexperienced teachers.

**Conclusion**

In the ongoing debate over how to improve teaching quality in public schools, there have been conflicting claims regarding the usefulness of currently available measures of teacher effectiveness. For example, in reference to a proposed initiative to measure teacher effectiveness using student test scores, the head of the New York City teachers’ union Randi Weingarten stated: “There is no way that any of this current data could actually, fairly, honestly or with any
integrity be used to isolate the contributions of an individual teacher” (as reported by Medina, 2008). In contrast, the U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (2009) has stated: “I have an open mind about teacher evaluation, but we need to find a way to measure classroom success and teacher effectiveness. Pretending that student outcomes are not part of the equation is like pretending that professional basketball has nothing to do with the score.”

Given the available evidence, we have tried to evaluate systematically how school leaders should use the currently available but imperfect measures of teacher effectiveness to recruit, evaluate, and retain teachers. Our simulations suggest that using existing information on teacher performance to aggressively select teachers would yield substantial annual gains in academic achievement of around 0.08 student level standard deviations. These are comparable to the annual test score gains found in recent experimental evaluations of charter schools (Hoxby and Murarka, 2009; Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, and Pathak, 2009) and comparable to the estimated annual impact of reducing class size in early elementary grades found in Project STAR (Krueger, 1999). Our analysis also suggests that there are substantial returns to investing in better information about teacher effectiveness, both at the time of hire and in the first few years on the job. Other measures of teacher performance, such as evaluations based on classroom observations, may be very useful. Finally, there may be other uses of this information that we did not consider in our analysis, such as for performance-based pay or targeted professional development, which would yield even larger gains. Systematically exploring the potential gains from these other uses would be valuable.

There are many practical obstacles to implementing a policy that denies tenure to a large proportion of new teachers. First, large upfront investments in teaching credentials make very high rates of terminations hard to support in equilibrium. Given that there is little evidence that such credentials are related to teacher effectiveness, our results suggest that an aggressive dismissal policy should be complimented by an easy entry policy. For example, as an alternative to obtaining credentials, districts could create an alternative port of entry in which any college graduate (without a criminal record) could become certified if they performed well on the job in their first year or two. One could imagine such an alternative certification route being an attractive option for many applicants, and the teachers obtaining the resulting certification being highly valued by schools. If applicants were still uneasy about investing time and effort in the difficult first years of teaching, districts could redesign the process to limit the up-front costs of a
“tryout” (for example, initially evaluating new teachers using brief summer school courses), and allow them to gain better pre-hire information at low cost. Similarly, it is interesting to consider a workforce development model that tries both to minimize the exposure of students to untested teachers and generate early-career information on teacher effectiveness. For example, instead of giving new teachers a full load of students and/or courses, principals could assign them to a small group of students or a single course and then use this limited teaching role to collect performance information.\(^\text{10}\) Of course, we do not know how reliably such information would predict later performance with a full set of teaching responsibilities, but we suspect it would be more informative than knowing where someone attended college or what they scored on a standardized certification examination.

Despite these issues and obstacles, the general message of our analysis remains. The current system, which focuses on credentials at the time of hire and grants tenure as a matter of course, is at odds with decades of evidence on teacher effectiveness. Instead, teacher recruitment and retention policies should focus on improving our methods of teacher evaluation and use admittedly imperfect measures of teacher effectiveness to identify and retain only the best teachers early in their teaching careers.

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References


\(^{10}\) Just five percent of recently hired teachers claim to have received a reduced workload in the first year of their careers according to the 2003 School and Staffing Survey.


Table 1
Evidence on Teacher Value Added from Schools in Los Angeles and New York City
(teacher value added measured in standard deviations of student performance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th>New York City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Math</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation in Teacher Value Added:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation of annual value-added measure</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability of annual value-added measure</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied standard deviation of persistent teacher effect</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in Value Added Relative to Teachers with 3+ Years Experience:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No experience teaching (novice)</td>
<td>–0.08</td>
<td>–0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One year of experience teaching</td>
<td>–0.02</td>
<td>–0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two years of experience teaching</td>
<td>–0.01</td>
<td>–0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Teacher value-added estimates are from analysis of data on 4th and 5th graders in years 2000–2003 for Los Angeles and 2000–2005 for New York City. Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance. Reliability of the value-added measure refers to the correlation of the value-added measure across classrooms taught by the same teacher. Estimates are based on regressions of student achievement that include student-level controls for baseline test scores, race/ethnicity, special education, English Language Learners (ELL), and free lunch status; classroom peer means of the student-level characteristics; and grade-by-year fixed effects.
**Figure 1**
Effect of Dismissing a Given Proportion of Novice Teachers Based on One Year of Data

Notes: Proportion dismissed (x-axis) refers to the proportion of teachers with the lowest value-added estimates that are dismissed after their first year. The solid line (and left axis) shows the steady state impact of each proportion dismissed on the value added of the average teacher, including those in their first year of teaching. Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance. The dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state impact of each proportion dismissed on the proportion of the teacher workforce in the first (or novice) year of teaching.
Table 2  
Effect of Delaying Tenure Decisions beyond the First Year, Options vs. Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline: Dismissal at $T = 1$</th>
<th>Dismissal allowed at any time until $T = 1$</th>
<th>Require dismissal only occur at time $T = 1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average value added</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dismissed overall</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dismissed annually</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At $T = 1$</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At $T = 2$</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At $T = 3$</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At $T = 4$</td>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Average value added refers to the average level of teachers' value-added estimates in the steady state under an optimal dismissal policy, and it includes both untenured and tenured teachers. (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.) “Percentages dismissed” refers to the percent of a single cohort of newly hired teachers dismissed during years leading up to when a tenure decision is required (year $T$).
Figure 2
Effect of Increasing the Reliability of the Pre-hire Performance Signal on Value Added of Average Teacher and Proportion of Teachers Dismissed after One Year

Note: Reliability (x-axis) refers to the proportion of variance in the pre-hire performance signal that is due to the persistent component of teacher performance. The solid line (and left axis) shows the steady state impact of reliability on the value added of the average teacher, including those in their first year of teaching, based on the optimal proportion of teachers dismissed after one year. (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.) The dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state impact of reliability on the optimal proportion dismissed after one year.
Figure 3
Effect of Reliability of the Annual Performance Measure on Optimal Timing of Tenure, Optimal Dismissal Rate, and Value Added of Average Teacher

Note: Figure 3 shows how changing the reliability of the on-the-job signal affects the optimal timing of tenure (regions delineated by dotted lines, labeled at top), the optimal dismissal rate (right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the school (left axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only dismiss teachers at tenure time \( T \). Reliability \( x \)-axis refers to the correlation of the annual performance measure across years within the same teacher. The dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state impact of reliability on the proportion dismissed. The solid line (and left axis) shows the steady state impact of reliability on the value added of the average teacher, including those in their first year of teaching, based on the optimal proportion of teachers dismissed after the optimal waiting period \( T \). (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.) The regions separated by horizontal dotted lines denote the optimal year in which the tenure decision should be made \( T \) for different levels of reliability.