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The Defeat of a Minister

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— M/W
The 1965 Tanzania General Elections

One Party Democracy

lionel Cliffe-editor



Chapter Six

RUNGWE

Defeat of a Minister¹


Bismarck Mwansasu and Norman N. Miller

The election defeat of a national Cabinet Minister in Rungwe West Constituency marked one of the most dramatic events of the 1965 Tanzania elections. Jeremiah S. Kasambala, the Minister for Industries, Mineral Resources and Power and a well-established political figure, was defeated at the polls by an unknown clerk from the local District Council. At first glance the outcome might seem due to a voting pattern which followed tribal lines: two small ethnic groups simply combined to defeat a member of the Nyakyusa people who predominate in the District. On closer analysis, however, far more complex factors emerge as contributing forces in the election outcome: an economic decline had occurred in the entire area; the two smaller tribes harboured strong feelings of remoteness and of government neglect; the registration of voters met with misunderstandings; and, as in other Tanzania constituencies, the supposed benefits from office gained by the incumbent and the difficulties of contact of a busy Minister with the people were effectively used against him. These factors were set against a political background that in many ways is unique. Comparatively, Rungwe District is highly educated, politically sophisticated, and economically prosperous. There has been an impressive history of successful experimentation in local government and political institution building. The present essay concerns the 1965 Parliamentary elections in one of Rungwe's three constituencies. It is an attempt to put a complex political event in perspective, and to analyse the varied forces which, in the end, led to the defeat of a Minister.

Because Rungwe District and the Nyakyusa people are well described in the literature, only the pertinent background factors that affected the 1965 elections will be discussed.² These factors are the geographic setting, population, ethnic and economic dimensions and the recent political history.

RUNGWE DISTRICT

- ++ International Boundaries
- - District Boundaries
- Divisional Boundaries
- Constituency Boundaries
- District Headquarters
- + Divisional Headquarters
- M K Candidates' Home
- Roads



The Geographic Setting and Population

Rungwe is a mountainous, lush District located at the head of Lake Malawi in Southwestern Tanzania. It is one of the smallest districts in the Republic, with an area of 1,874 square miles. The predominant physical features are the Livingstone Mountains on the East which separate Rungwe and Njombe Districts, the Songwe River on the Southeast which forms the boundary between Tanzania and Malawi, and the fertile, flat lake plains area extending 15-20 miles north of Lake Malawi (see Map 9). A semi-mountainous highlands area rises from the lake plains and extends to the north into the Poroto Mountains which form Rungwe's northern border. Mount Rungwe, (9,713 feet) from which the District takes its name, is located near the northern gateway to the District. The Bundali Mountains rise in the west central region and tumble down toward Lake Malawi. They form a natural barrier to communications between the more prosperous central area of Rungwe and the upland plateau areas of the far west. It is in these western areas that the minority peoples, the Ndali and Lambya, make their homes. Tukuyu in the centre of the District is the administrative capital as well as the main trade and communications centre. It is located at an altitude of 5,300 feet and has an estimated African population of 4,500.¹ Rungwe has one of the highest rates of rainfall in Tanzania, with an average of 100 inches per year. This rainfall accounts for a high agricultural production, and except for the drier Lambya area in the extreme West, famine and food shortage are practically unknown. The rainfall also accounts for the relative wealth of the area: coffee, rice and tea are the main cash crops while sweet potatoes, beans, millet, maize, cassava and bananas are grown mainly for local consumption.

The 1957 census gave the Rungwe population at 271,287, and it is now estimated by government officials to be about 355,000. The District is very densely populated averaging approximately 350 per square mile on the lake plains and 250 per square mile in the central highlands.⁴ Over-population combined with land shortage, and the closing of labour opportunities in South Africa and Zambia in recent years, has created a potentially critical social situation. The District has limited arable land, and the opportunity for agricultural expansion is severely limited. Migrating from the District involves crossing the mountain barriers and taking up an entirely new pattern of life. This is resisted both for obvious ethno-

centric reasons and, more practically, because of the high rate of illnesses experienced by those who have migrated. The rainfall in Rungwe allows a healthful milk and banana diet which is supplemented by an abundance of pure water from the mountain streams. Settlement in the drier areas means adjusting to local water sources, plus an inferior diet and an entirely different climate. The result for most is a reluctance to move and thus, over-population.

Nevertheless population pressure has in fact become so great that there is some movement into surrounding districts. The Nyakyusa are thus to be found in significant proportions elsewhere in Mbeya Region, especially in Chunya and Mbeya Districts. Because of their greater educational level and their presence in the towns they have come to dominate the politics of the Region. Their presence and their political dominance is resented on occasions and this was a factor in the elections in the two districts mentioned above. In Mbeya, a Nyakyusa lost to his less-educated opponent, who, while also an "immigrant" to the District was more tolerated. In Chunya, Rowland Mwanjisi, a member of TANU's Central Committee and a Junior Minister, who had chosen not to face the opposition in his home constituency of Rungwe North, was not selected by the District Conference of the Party.

Ethnic Groups

The three main tribal groups of Rungwe are the Nyakyusa, Ndali, and Lambya. The Nyakyusa are predominant, inhabiting the main part of the District immediately to the north of Lake Malawi; in 1957 they numbered 224,590.¹ Because there are unusually large ecological variations in the District, at least three distinct life patterns are apparent among the Nyakyusa. The Nyakyusa of the lake plains live at approximately 1,500-2,000 feet and subsist mainly on rice and fish. Those of the uplands areas (2,000-4,500 feet) immediately north of the lake plain produce some coffee and tea, while the highland Nyakyusa above 4,500 feet are heavy coffee growers and banana eaters. They are traditionally divided into numerous small independent chiefdoms, each autonomous and each with a hierarchy of chiefs, senior headmen, headmen, and commoners. The social organisation until recent times was based on a system of age-villages by which boys of seven or eight years were expected to leave their fathers' homes and build their own individual huts, later to establish themselves in permanent

age-villages. This system is breaking down because of land shortage and the tendency for many boys to go away to boarding school.

For the purpose of analysing the election, one of the more important social traits of the Nyakyusa is the enthusiasm for education. This leads to a comparatively high level of mass discussion and interest in public issues. There is a willingness to accept social change, which has made the District an experimentation centre for several local government and peasant mobilisation projects.⁴ Conversely, there is within Nyakyusa contemporary society a slight contempt for authority and an inclination to take anti-government positions on issues affecting the individual. Thus, unwanted decrees by Central Government have often met with outspoken opposition. A sizeable leadership group exists within the District, stemming from a large number of small chiefdoms. Each chiefdom featured a chief and a "great commoner" (both now officially deposed) and, in the modern context, TANU and village administrative leaders. The early formation of the Rungwe African Co-operative Union in 1948 and the Rungwe African District Council in 1949 also gave an opportunity for a modern leadership élite to develop. Moreover, the British Government favoured several of the Rungwe chiefs with educational and travel opportunities. One chief was sent to England to witness Elizabeth's coronation. Other local leaders travelled widely on behalf of the colonial government to explain Rungwe's local government and co-operative organisations to leaders in other districts. The broader picture, therefore, of Nyakyusa society includes articulate, outward-looking leaders who are aware of the events of modern politics and who debate political issues on a wide scale.

The Ndali people, the second major ethnic group in Rungwe, live in the mountains of the west-central portion of the District. Although the Ndali have different myths of origin than the Nyakyusa (supposedly they are an offshoot of the Mahanzi people who lived on top of the Livingstone Range, eastward of Selya* where the Nyakyusa claim their origin) they have long resided in close proximity to the Nyakyusa and have largely adopted their language and customs. The old language of Ndali is rapidly becoming extinct, and intermarriage and mixed settlement between the two peoples are common.

The geographic situation of the Ndali has been a major condition.

* In present day Njombe District.

ing factor in their attitudes to external political authorities. They are mountain people. One long and tortuous road connects the area with the administrative capital, Tukuyu, but because of the high rainfall it is often closed. For up to five months a year the mountains are virtually impenetrable, except by foot safari. From the Moravian Mission dispensary at Isoko in the heart of Ndali country, it is a two-day walk for eight stretcher-bearers to carry a seriously ill kinsman into the Tukuyu hospital. Local government services, schools, dispensaries, and markets lag far behind the Nyakyusa portion of the District. Most Ndali people are painfully aware of this and do not hesitate to criticise the central and local governments for the difficulties caused by their isolated state.

The third tribal group, the Lambya, number some 13,500 and live in the extreme west of the District. The area is a dry, rolling plateau, and the people are even more remote from the administrative heart of Rungwe than are the Ndali. In fact, the Lambya area is more an appendage of Malawi, and the tribe itself is split by the Songwe River which separates Tanzania and Malawi. Many of the same geographic factors that affect the Ndali also affect the Lambya. Although their area is not as cut-off by mountains, it is nearly as inaccessible. Government officers travelling from Tukuyu must leave Rungwe District by road, go through a portion of Mbeya District and re-enter Rungwe from the northwest. The result is a marked lack of government services. As in the Ndali area, remoteness, lack of development, and the feeling that government has ignored them, were important factors as the Lambya people prepared for the election.

Economic Conditions

The major economic considerations relevant to the election are the agricultural regionalism that exists in Rungwe, the presence of five European-owned tea estates, the activities of the Rungwe African Co-operative Union (RACU), the coffee price fluctuations in recent years, and the lack of road and market facilities.

First, agricultural regionalism, as suggested earlier, is important in the District. In addition to the unique conditions that exist in the Ndali and Lambya areas, the Nyakyusa areas are divided into lake plains, central uplands and highland areas, all having marked differences in rainfall, crops, and production methods. It

would be wrong to suggest that voting was solely conditioned by regional agricultural considerations even in an agrarian society, but it could be equally unwise to under-emphasise the regional differences that condition a voter. It is suggested here and will be elaborated upon later that the two more remote agricultural regions, the Ndali and Lambya areas, in fact cast a protest vote against, among other things, their own regional remoteness.

Second, the five tea estates in Rungwe are a powerful economic factor. Each is owned by a European firm and the management living on them is European (British, Dutch and Swiss). Together, the estates employ about 3,000 workers. Many residents of the Nyakyusa villages in the central highlands are economically dependent on the estates, getting a part of their income from casual or seasonal labour. To keep labour disputes to a minimum, most of the estates have had close ties with the district political and administrative organisations. The African assistant manager of one estate is the eight times re-elected TANU Chairman,* and the estate's management wholeheartedly support his political activities. Another African assistant manager unsuccessfully stood for Parliament. One of the estates has had long-standing friendly ties with the incumbent, Kasambala, and actually campaigned on and off the estate for his re-election. At least one estate provided trucks to help register voters and to transport delegates to the TANU selection conference. A full "battle plan" was laid out by one manager to aid his candidate. Veiled threats of job loss were to be used if workers did not vote for the right candidate, and the timing of the plan took into account the possibility of complaint to the administration. Pressure was to be applied by key clerks and field managers who were known as opinion leaders. The manager confidently predicted that of the 402 registered voters on the estate, he would deliver 400 votes for his candidate and dismiss the two dissenting voters.

Third, the Rungwe African Co-operative Union, which is the coffee marketing organisation, has had strong political influence. The incumbent Kasambala began his political career as a Union official, as have several other leaders of the District. The Union has 25 primary societies, 25,000 members, and markets coffee and mixed produce. A second Co-operative Union, formerly part of

* William Mwambenja, the District Party Chairman, actually stood in the Rungwe North Constituency but narrowly missed selection.

the Rungwe Union, is the Unyakyusa Co-operative Union, which comprises nine primary societies in the lake plain area and deals almost exclusively with rice. Both Unions have come under strong criticism by their membership, in part for the high cost of maintaining the Union* (carried by farmers) and in part for the large number of alleged thefts by officers of the local societies. One responsible official stated that each of the 34 societies change their secretaries or treasurers on the average once every four months.

A degree of public criticism of the two Unions is probably unavoidable. The Government forbids a farmer to sell his products privately, and the Union prices are the only prices available. Both Unions control funds, goods for sale, jobs, building contracts, and investments; the allocation of these resources easily becomes a political matter, and those individuals who are not favoured by the co-operative's management are likely to be critical. Moreover, the Unions are the paying agent for coffee, rice and other products, and unavoidably are held responsible for low prices by the farmers. The fact is, however, that prices are usually determined by fluctuations in world market conditions, or by Central Government policy.

Fourth, the condition of roads and availability of markets had a considerable bearing on the election. There is only one main road into the District and it is the vital life line for the entire area. The heavy export of coffee, rice and maize and the import of consumer goods, places a considerable strain on the road. The administration has consistently made efforts to improve this facility, but the heavy rains and volcanic soil have generally frustrated these efforts. The consequence is a rutted, occasionally impassable road, and the corresponding high transport costs for goods. Because

* The cost of maintaining the co-operative's administrative structure shows considerable variations over the years. On the average, the cost to the farmer is about 20% of the gross profit. Reliable figures, however, are not available after 1957. See the *Rungwe African Co-operative Union, Ltd., Ninth Annual Report, 1956-1957*. Tukuyu, 1957:

	Coffee%	Rice%
Direct Marketing Expenses	7.2	12.5
Transport	3.6	2.7
RACU Levy and Commission on Sales	3.8	2.7
Societies Levies*	3.7	6.1
Native Treasuries cess**	4.3	4.1
Net to Growers, Proceeds	81.0	74.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

* primary or local societies.

** i.e., local government levy.

of this, the paving of the road from near Mbeya to Tukuyu, or Itungi Port on Lake Malawi, has been a political issue since Independence. The fact that the paving project had not been accomplished was blamed on Kasambala and used by his opponent to point up the inaccessibility of Rungwe and the lack of general progress in the District.

The Experience in Voting

The first organised elections held in the District were the 1949 local government elections, organised in conjunction with the Rural Council system. Councillors for the Rungwe African District Council, were elected by Councillors from each of five Rural Councils, who in turn had been elected from their parish or village areas. Similar elections were held in 1951 and 1953. The elections of 1956 and 1959 for local government councillors, however, introduced the "whispering vote" system to replace the "show of hands". This was a method by which the voter whispered his candidate's name to the voting officer who tallied the votes. In 1959 a new District Council constitution came into effect, and the District was divided into 39 constituencies, each to elect one representative to the Council. By 1961 the mid-level Rural Councils had been abolished, and voters elected their representatives directly to the District Council by secret ballot. The elections of 1962 again reflected changes in procedure. The Council had been re-constituted under the new Local Government Ordinance (Cap. 333), but the Local Government Election Act had not come into effect. The balloting was informal with voters merely forming lines behind their candidates.

Beginning in 1958, a series of nation-wide general elections also gave the people of Rungwe experience in the voting process. In 1958, Rungwe was a portion of the Southern Highlands constituency, and only a few individuals (who qualified under the multi-racial "parity system") were able to vote.* The 1960 general elections, however, not only included Rungwe as a single constituency, but gave voting franchise on a broader base. A total of 7,682 individuals were registered. In that election, J. S. Kasambala, was the TANU candidate. He polled 4,490 votes against his

* The winning African candidate in 1958 was John Mwakangale who defeated Timothy Sankey, both of whom were Nyakyusa. In 1960 Mwakangale was elected for the Mbeya constituency, and was subsequently made a Regional Commissioner.

opponent's (T. M. Sankey, Independent)† 11. During the first Presidential election held in 1962, the electorate had increased to 35,775 registered voters. Julius Nyerere swept the election with 21,979 votes while his opponent, Zuberi Mtemvu, tallied 325 votes.

In sum, a total of ten national or local government elections had taken place in the District. The people had been introduced to a relatively formal electoral process as early as 1949, and although the national experience had been instances of "no opposition" (i.e. Kasambala and Nyerere stood practically unopposed), the local government elections had been real contests between competing individuals. Another obvious difference between the local and national elections was one of "individual" vs. "issue". The local government contests were over personalities. The national elections concerned issues—the question of a multi-racial constitution, the timing for Independence, and the nature of the state which would then come into being. The 1962 presidential election was mainly a vote of confidence for Julius Nyerere. Considering the ten elections, however, the overall Rungwe experience at the polls was substantial.

Background to the 1965 Election

As the 1965 elections approached, the general picture in Rungwe was one of minor economic recession, a mood of restrained social discontent, and an often articulated desire to end what seemed to be a slipping back from the better years when coffee prices were higher. For a decade the Central Government had watched this area with some apprehension, in case these conditions would lead to political unrest. Several surface indications of tension existed. Rungwe had the highest litigation rate in the country as seen in the fact that one of four Nyakyusa was in court for something each year;⁷ land shortage had become acute; and, an increasing population compounded the land problem, (the number of people in the lake plains area soared to over 400 per square mile). Moreover, prices for coffee and rice since 1960 had been disappointingly low, and flooding on the lake plains had left many rice farmers without a cash crop. The major sources of income for many young men, and for their families, had in the past come from migrating labour trips

† Sankey was ranked fifth in the Rungwe North seat in 1965.

to the Rand in South Africa, to the Copperbelt in Zambia, to Southern Rhodesia, to Malawi, and internally to the Lupa goldfields or the Tanga region sisal estates. Within a period of three years these sources of income were virtually closed. The political boycott by Tanzania of South Africa led to the close of employment possibilities on the Rand. Similar measures were taken against Zambia and that country's returning workers flooded into the Copperbelt and thus reduced the job openings for Tanzanians. The Lupa goldfields and the Mpanda mine in Tanzania had been closed earlier and the sisal plantations, facing falling world prices, have not provided sufficient substitute employment for Nyakyusa workers. Minor incidents over the last ten years indicate other forms of unrest in the District. In 1955-1956, a rash of witchcraft cases swept a large part of Rungwe. The outcome was the Tukuyu witchcraft trials of 1957 in which twelve individuals were convicted, the colonial government suggesting that the convicted individuals were only a small proportion of those practising in the District. This led to tacit government approval of witch-hunters to help bring witch practitioners to trial.

Other instances of unrest occurred in October, 1960, when riots took place near Kyela, on the lake plain, claiming one life and culminating long feuds over chiefdom boundaries and fishing rights. As inheritance within chiefdoms came up for settlement, disputes over actual rights of occupancy were common. Feuds between chiefdoms occurred as land shortage became more acute and in 1963 and 1964 violence erupted over the payment of local tax. In these cases revenue collectors were attacked with sticks and government vehicles stoned.

The unrest that has occurred in the past ten years is fundamentally economic based, more specifically land based.* The

* The ten-year period of unrest coincided with the years the major party TANU, was being established (1957), and becoming a viable political organisation (*circa* 1959-60). By 1965, TANU in the District had grown to a well-organised structure, made up of 17 branches, and 140 local (village) units. The Party organisation, as effective in Rungwe as in most Tanzania districts, served the functions of agent for the Government, activator of the people, and propagandiser of government policy. The Party activities undoubtedly aided local understanding and kept incidents of unrest from spreading. Earlier, during the colonial period, the Party offered dissident factions an organisational structure and helped abate local tensions by channelling energies into a non-violent colonial protest.

implications for such unrest in the voting process become exceedingly complex. As a distraught farmer comes to the polls, there is no way of telling what outside pressures will influence his decision. The vote can be perceived by him as a bludgeon. It can be used in protest against a general way of life, against a specific grievance, or against an individual. To stipulate the effects of widespread discontent can only be done as surface conditions suggest. We do know there was a highly agitated political atmosphere in Rungwe prior to the election. Discussion, debate, and diatribe were commonplace. There was a great deal of talk about improvements in tangible ways of life: more material goods, more schools, more dispensaries, more personal profits, and better services. The fact that many did view the election as a way to change their material welfare is in itself significant. It suggests that ideas of representative government, and what a representative might do for the individual, were operating at the grass-roots.

Delimiting the Constituencies

In October 1962, the Electoral Commission charged the Rungwe District Council with the task of suggesting the boundaries of the three constituencies in the District. The final Council decision was to divide Rungwe according to the existing local government divisional boundaries.* As already noted, the tribal composition of the seven divisions, however, presented a special problem. Five of the divisions cover an area inhabited mainly by the Nyakyusa, one contains predominately Ndali and the seventh mainly Lambya. After prolonged debate, it was decided to mix one Nyakyusa division within the Ndali and Lambya areas (see Map 9). The result was that Rungwe West constituency has a polyglot tribal structure, as reflected in the 1957 Census figures:

* The local government structure in the District is a three-part administrative tier, i.e., a district headquarters, seven divisional headquarters, and 136 Village Development Committees, which operate as the lowest local government unit. The local government personnel organisation, however, is in a four-part tier. These are an Executive Officer plus his staff at the District Council, seven Divisional Executive Officers, 20 Assistant Divisional Executive Officers, each with his own area of responsibility, and 136 Village Executive Officers, (1965).

TABLE 6. 1: RUNGWE WEST CONSTITUENCY DIVISIONS*

<i>Ethnic Groups</i>	<i>Pakati</i>	<i>Bundali</i>	<i>Bulambya</i>	<i>Total</i>
Nyakyusa	36,918	—	157	37,075
Ndali	9,235	21,107	8,424	38,766
Lambya	128	—	12,891	13,019
Others	2,024	153	14	2,191
Total	48,305	21,260	21,486	91,051

* Divisional breakdowns from Rungwe District Headquarters, Tukuyu, Tanzania. The absence of Nyakyusa or Lambya inhabitants in Bundali Division is unexplained. The probability is that for some reason census takers group these people with the Ndali. The discrepancy calls into question the entire set of figures and they should be taken as broad approximations.

Registration

In April 1965, the Electoral Commission announced that the registration of voters would begin on June 1st and last for two months. In Rungwe the campaign was not a total success, and the number finally registered was significantly lower than expected (see Table 6.2). Several reasons for the shortcomings were apparent. While the Government urged everyone to register, no attempt was

TABLE 6. 2: TABLE OF REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN RUNGWE WEST

<i>Division</i>	<i>Pakati</i>	<i>Bundali</i>	<i>Bulambia</i>	<i>Total</i>
Population	48,305	21,260	21,486	91,051
Registration	15,974	7,370	8,071	31,415
Approx. %	40%	33.3%	34%	34%

made to impress upon the public that the coming elections would operate under a new system and that an actual contest between two candidates would be held. This was particularly important in Rungwe West because the representative of the old Rungwe Constituency, Kasambala, was likely to stand for re-election and Rungwe West included his home division (Pakati). Under the old system he would be the official party candidate, and it is likely that some people did not register simply because they felt the election had been predetermined. Earlier national elections, as noted, had seen candidates standing virtually unopposed. Others undoubtedly failed to register because they were dissatisfied with the work of Kasambala and considered abstention to be the best protest. Equally important was the fact that local taxes were being intensively collected often by the same government officials who conduct-

ed the registration campaign. The process of registration was confused with tax collection, and many individuals avoided the registration centres for fear of being taxed. It was only after it had been made explicit that registration had nothing to do with taxes that many potential voters came forward. Unfortunately for some, the realization came too late. The tax confusion may also explain the high proportion of women who registered (as non-taxpayers, they could safely register).

Other detriments to registration existed. In the 1962 election, people had been forced to walk long distances to register, in some cases up to 30 miles. It was not clear to many that there would be 82 registration clerks, and that registration could be done in one's home area.* In addition, the names of the candidates were not known during most of the registration period. Many individuals were simply not interested in registering because they were not sure for what, or for whom, they were registering. When the candidates' names were finally announced, only one week of registration remained. The result was an eleventh hour rush to the centres, particularly in Pakati, the Minister's home division. During that week a great deal of confusion resulted, giving rise to the complaint that the registration clerks were favouring Mbembela by not being available in Kasambala's home area and by spending most of their time in the Ndali and Lambya divisions. The complaint of unavailable clerks was not considered serious enough to be taken to the Electoral Commission, although it does suggest that more time was needed for the entire process.

As the figures indicate, the final registration showed Kasambala's home area, Pakati, with the highest registration in proportion to population, and by far the greatest number of potential voters (see Table 6.2).

The Nomination of Candidates

The invitation* to interested TANU members to offer themselves as candidates for election met with an enthusiastic response. In the three Rungwe constituencies a total of 27 men took out nomination papers.† Rungwe West initially had four candidates, but two were

*The 82 registration officers were under the direction of the Area Secretary, the administrative officer responsible for the conduct of the elections. The clerks were recent Standard VIII graduates, Village Development Committee and TANU (local branch) Secretaries, and some District Council employees.

† Fifteen finally stood from Rungwe South, and eight from Rungwe North.

disqualified on the grounds that their nomination papers were illegally signed by people living outside their constituency.* The disqualifications led to allegations of collusion. The specific charges were on the one hand that the Minister had used pressure to assure that two of his opponents would be eliminated, and on the other that the Minister's remaining opponent, Osiah Mbembela, had at the last minute received the two men's backing in order not to split any protest vote against the Minister. Neither charges had any substance as both prospective candidates were excluded on proper technical grounds. Neither charge was formally investigated.

As in all districts, the nomination process was carried out by the Annual District Conference of TANU, sitting as a selection committee. The conference in Rungwe was attended by eighty-four TANU branch delegates, plus representatives of the TANU Youth League (T.Y.L.) and the Women's Organisation, (U.W.T.). Because there were only two candidates standing from Rungwe West, the conference did not consider them, but merely sent their names to Dar es Salaam to the TANU National Executive Committee.†

The Candidates

Jeremiah S. Kasambala, 39, was born at Itula in Pakati Division of a chiefly Nyakyusa family. He was educated at Mpuguso Primary School, Malangali Secondary School, and later obtained a diploma at a co-operative college in England. His early career

* The papers were objected to after nominations had closed, as being contrary to Section 27 (1) of the National Assembly Election Act.

† This was not the case with the other two Rungwe constituencies. Each candidate was interviewed and questioned. There was apparently active lobbying among delegates for certain candidates before the meeting. The night before the nomination meeting the beer supplies in Tukuyu ran short and one candidate personally helped replenish the supply from a neighbouring town. The results of the Nomination Conference were also surprising. William Mwambenja, the eight times re-elected TANU Chairman of the District and Chairman of the District Council, was ranked third in the Rungwe North nominations, and Haynes Mwakangale, an Area Commissioner, and long-time political activist (former Deputy Secretary-General of TANU and the party's District Secretary for Tukuyu) was ranked sixth. The two names sent to the National Executive for confirmation for Rungwe North were Eli M. Anangisy, the Assistant General Manager of COSATA in Dar es Salaam, and O. A. Katule, a farmer. The Rungwe South nominations were Reverend Robert Mwakalukwa, a pastor in the Moravian Church, and Sanke Kamomonga, the Deputy Chairman of the Rungwe Council. Eli Anangisy and Reverend Mwakalukwa proved victorious as M.P.s each with a majority of over 13,000 votes.

is a story of a rapid rise to political power. In 1947, after his secondary schooling and training as a medical assistant, he returned to Rungwe to become a sub-chief in Masuku in Pakati Division. The following year he joined the Civil Service as a co-operative inspector, and was later sent for training at the East African School of Co-operatives at Kabete in Kenya. Upon his return to Rungwe in 1952, he was elected secretary to the newly-formed Rungwe African Co-operative Union, (RACU).

He then spent a year studying co-operatives at Loughborough in Britain and on his return was made Manager of RACU, a position he held until 1961 when he became Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives. Kasambala had joined TANU in July, 1957, and the following year became a delegate to the Regional Annual Conference. Later he was a member of the National Executive Committee and a delegate to the Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa. In the 1960 elections he was the official Party candidate for Rungwe constituency and was returned with a sweeping majority. In January, 1962, he became Minister for Co-operatives and Community Development. Two years later, in November, 1964, a cabinet reshuffle took place, and he was appointed Minister for Industries, Mineral Resources and Power, a post he held until his defeat in the 1965 elections.

Osiah A. Mbembela, 29, is a Lambya from Bupigu in Bulambya Division, who has spent most of his working life in Pakati and Bundali Divisions. In addition to a Standard VIII education he did an apprenticeship course at Ifunda Trade School in Iringa District. From 1957 to 1961, he worked as Secretary of the local co-operative society at Katengele in Bundali Division, and thereafter joined the District Council as the Divisional Executive Officer for Bundali Division. In 1963 he was abruptly transferred from Bundali, allegedly because he had prematurely engaged in campaigning for the forthcoming general elections. He later served in Busokelo Division, and in 1964 was brought to the District Council headquarters in Tukuyu as a committee clerk. Since 1957, he has been an active party member, a Councillor to the District Council, a TANU dues collector, and a Party National Conference delegate. Apart from a three-month visit to East Germany, his activities have been restricted to the District. He resigned his District Council position to stand for election.

The Election Campaign

The official campaign in Rungwe West took the form of arranged public meetings lasting from the middle of August until the middle of September. They were characterised at the beginning by formal, polite statements, and at the end by bitter, personal attacks that became so violent that the election supervisors, who acted as impartial referees, had to intervene. The debate that did emerge was not over policy issues as such (nor were the audiences allowed to participate in any way), but rather on what the candidates would do in office and how they justified their past actions. As the meetings progressed, the individual campaign plans of the two men became apparent.

Kasambala's strategy was to identify himself with governmental achievements in the last five years. He reminded the electorate of the rapid progress which the country had made in social and economic development, particularly in the fields of industrialisation and education. He pointed out that the new, smallholder tea schemes, and the production of kenaf (a fibrous plant) were recent government-backed innovations in Rungwe. Occasionally he mentioned government plans for future development of the District, with the suggestion that he himself was partially responsible. These included the possibility of a railway link with Zambia, the paving of the main road into the District from Mbeya to Itungi, the electrification of Tukuyu township within a few months, the development of a local coal mine and a Secondary School for the District. He further argued that the most qualified person should be the Member of Parliament, and that his legislative career spoke for itself. His experience, travel, and wide knowledge of Parliamentary affairs were constantly mentioned.

When the campaign became personal, Kasambala attempted to discredit Mbembela as an incompetent. He claimed that he himself had taught the younger man the skills needed to work as a co-operative secretary, but that Mbembela had not learned properly and had been a failure. It was also suggested that Mbembela's frequent transfers in local government positions were due to his inefficiency.

As in other districts, the candidates exchanged the right to speak first at each campaign meeting. Usually the first speaker either answered charges from the previous meeting, although he was now addressing a different audience, or pre-empted the attacks he

expected from his opponent. Mbembela began the campaign with a disadvantage because he was generally unknown, and at the early meetings he found it necessary to introduce himself and his cause. There was little of the easy atmosphere that Kasambala enjoyed when speaking in his home areas. Mbembela's approach was to criticise the incumbent's five-year record, emphasising that he had done little for the constituency. He attributed the lack of progress in Rungwe since Independence to the Minister's lack of interest in the rural people. It was pointed out that a good Minister was one who could effectively articulate the interests of his constituency in Dar es Salaam. This had not been done, Mbembela claimed. Further, although Kasambala had made it a point of identifying himself with government plans and performances, Mbembela argued that such things did not come from the Minister, but rather through central government representatives in the District.

Although Kasambala's unfulfilled election promises were discussed by Mbembela, there is little evidence that the actual pledges—a paved road from Mbeya to Itungi and electricity for Tukuyu—were in themselves significant to the voters in the villages. Most farmers live far from the main road and would not benefit from Tukuyu electricity. The implications suggested by Mbembela about these promises, however, were significant. Mbembela contended that the pledges proved that the electorate had been cheated and ignored by their Member of Parliament and that because of this, it would be wise for them to try a new M.P. Throughout the campaign, Mbembela also discussed the personal service a Member of Parliament must offer the people, and the easy access any man should have to his representative. This indirect critique, suggesting what Kasambala had not done, was usually followed by some example of how distant the present M.P. was from the people. The Mercedes car, the infrequency of his visits, the circle of police around him when he did come, the obvious economic gap between the Minister and his people, were all cited. Mbembela even informed certain audiences that the other candidate on the platform was the Honourable J. S. Kasambala who had been their M.P. for five years—in case they were not aware of the fact.

Among the most effective criticisms Mbembela levelled at Kasambala was the latter's record as the Manager of the Rungwe Co-operative Union. He accused the Minister of leaving RACU in a chaotic financial state, and of being responsible for the accu-

mulated debts of the Union. The argument was carefully followed by the farmers. Even before Kasambala became Minister, the price of coffee had declined. Many farmers believed that the employees of RACU, managers included, were "stealing" the farmers' money,* and that most of them were not getting the profits they rightfully deserved. When Mbembela mentioned this point, it seemed to confirm suspicions harboured by many farmers. The countercharge levelled by Kasambala was that the reason for inefficiency in the Union was incompetent secretaries at the local level—a prime example of which was Mbembela.

An interesting side light on the campaign was the significance of the symbols used for each candidate. Although both symbols, the hoe and the house, have meaning in traditional Nyakyusa culture, neither seemed to have influenced the actual voting. Kasambala did try to identify with the hoe, suggesting it linked him closely with the farmers. This was rather unsuccessful as Mbembela stated that the hoe was a superficial symbol for a man who did not earn his living from the soil. It was also suggested in the gossip that the Government had given Kasambala the hoe because the leaders in Dar es Salaam wanted Kasambala to go back to the land, and had given Mbembela the house as a sign they wanted him to come to Parliament.

As the official campaign drew to a close, Kasambala offered a number of explanations that implied neglect of the District. On several occasions he said that in the past he had found no time to fight for the Nyakyusa people because it had been necessary to fight against the colonialists. After Independence he had spent his time struggling to get more money for Tanzania, since the colonialists had taken most of it away. This year (1965) was the first time he could take up the cause of the Nyakyusa. On these points, Mbembela insisted that the Minister had done nothing to advance the Rungwe people except his friends in the Rungwe Co-operative Union. Mbembela noted how Rungwe-born administrators, teachers, and new graduates were not given opportunities for advancement either in the capital or throughout the country. Since the District had a high proportion of people in the Central Government and many in school, the argument was closely followed. During the campaign, Mbembela's criticisms of Kasambala were as a local representative. Kasambala's record as a Minister was

* This could include suspicions of out-right theft, over-staffing, nepotism, etc.

not called into question—indeed his effectiveness as a Minister probably contributed to his lack of contact with his constituency.

The Unofficial Campaign

Active unofficial campaigns were carried on on behalf of both candidates. These activities had several dimensions. Charges had been made against Mbembela that he began campaigning as far back as 1963;* counter charges were made that Kasambala was using his family connections with former chiefs to bring pressure on the voters. The tea estates also took part in the informal campaigns although they supported different candidates. In addition, some local leaders in the Ndali-Nyakyusa border areas who had signed Kasambala's nomination papers were known to be supporting Mbembela. The inference was that pressure from the Pakati "organisation" had forced them to support Kasambala's nomination openly, but that their true support lay with Mbembela. The area is mixed between Ndali-Nyakyusa, and the issue was a major talking point. In the end the border area gave Kasambala a 4.1 margin of victory, slightly lower than his 5.1 average throughout the Pakati Division.

When the official campaign meetings ended, the Kasambala organisation believed he had lost ground to Mbembela, and that there was a great deal of political fence-mending to do. In the unofficial campaigning, Kasambala supporters chose to concentrate their efforts in the Minister's home area, Pakati, probably because the highest registration was there, and the existing road network allowed for greater mobility. This is also a predominately Nyakyusa area and chances of gaining support on a tribal basis were obvious. In this respect, Kasambala supporters used several "unofficial" methods. Because the Minister is from a chiefly family and such families are connected in a loose kinship network throughout the division, appeals could be made to traditional leaders to "help a family member". Where former chiefs still command allegiance, this approach was effective. A door-to-door campaign was also carried out in several areas. Kasambala workers asked voters to think twice, to forgive and forget, and to vote for the more experienced man. The travelling TANU District Executive Committee, which was officially to campaign for President Nyerere's

* As noted earlier, this is allegedly the reason he was transferred from Bundali as a Divisional Executive Officer.

re-election and explain the procedures of voting, was also alleged to have supported Kasambala.*

Mbembela also suffered from an effective whisper campaign concerning his past record as a Divisional Executive Officer for the Rungwe Council. He had served in two areas and was transferred from both to the accompaniment of rumours. As the Divisional Executive Officer of Unyakyusa Division in 1964, his detractors claimed he was removed because he was trying to persuade the people to break away from Rungwe and to form a separate district. He was transferred to Busokelo Division, and shortly thereafter was involved in an incident over local tax collection. Allegedly, in his zeal to collect taxes, Mbembela affronted the dignity of certain elders. He was soon transferred, supposedly under the threat of being speared. Both Busokelo and Unyakyusa Divisions although part of the next constituency are adjacent to Pakati Division and voters in these border areas undoubtedly heard these rumours. Although there is no evidence to suggest there is any truth in them, they did have the effect of giving support to Kasambala's cause.†

The Voting and the Results

Throughout the constituency the election proceeded peacefully, although several complaints were lodged with district officials. Kasambala supporters, for example, charged that a few polling stations had run out of ballots, and others had closed early. Upon investigation, the charge of closing early was found to be true at three stations. Instead of placing an officer at the end of the voting line at 6.00 p.m. and allowing those individuals in front of the officer to vote, two polls had closed abruptly at 6.00 p.m.. Another polling station had closed earlier in the day when the polling attendants believed no other voters would be

* The charges against the TANU Committee were that they had limited their activities to Pakati, Kasambala's area; that they had conducted meetings in Kinyakyusa, and not Kiswahili as required in the official campaign meetings; that one of the Committee members was an outspoken supporter of Kasambala, and the fact that the Committee openly gave advice that people should vote for a man with experience who "had been seen" doing the job, the reference being to Kasambala and not the President.

† A counter-balancing factor for this area would be that some voters probably remembered that Kasambala, when he was in the administration, was responsible for the arrest and imprisonment of a senior chief in the area on theft charges. The main polling stations in the border area showed inconclusive results: Busisya: Kasambala—352, Mbembela—243.

forthcoming. After discussion with election officials, both candidates accepted the situation without reference to Dar es Salaam. In addition, four cases of improper conduct by polling agents were reported, but none were serious enough to be charged in court.* As was the case throughout Tanzania, completely secret voting was not always possible, especially where polling assistants had to mark ballots for illiterate voters. There were no serious charges that voter ignorance had been exploited, although complaints about campaigning at polling stations did reach the administration. One common discrepancy was "campaigning in line". As an example, one voter in Pakati was known to have reached the voting table eight times, then stepped away and returned to the end of the line. He was arguing on behalf of his candidate, and found the voting line to be a most effective platform.

The final count showed Mbembela to be the victor by a majority of 1,171 votes. The total vote cast was 23,935. Each candidate had roughly a 5-1 margin in his home division, although Bundali Division gave Mbembela an overwhelming 17-1 majority. The figures per division are as follows:

TABLE 6.3. VOTING IN RUNGWE WEST.
DIVISION

	<i>Pakati</i>	<i>Bundali</i>	<i>Bulambia</i>	<i>Total</i>
Mbembela	2,658	4,811	5,094	12,563
Kasambala	10,131	272	969	11,372

Conclusion

As pointed out in our introduction, the voting figures suggest that ethnic identifications played a crucial role in determining the outcome of the contest. Kasambala, a Nyakyusa, received most of his votes in the Nyakyusa dominated Pakati Division while his opponent, a non-Nyakyusa, did best in the non-Nyakyusa areas. As further indicated, an explanation based purely on tribal analysis would be grossly misleading for an area as politically complex as Rungwe. In order to analyse the vote, two key questions should be posed. First, what were the particu-

* This was not the case in Rungwe South, where an agent tried to overpower the presiding officer and a polling assistant and take control of the ballot box. He was arrested and charged.

lar forces at work in each division that accounted for the voting patterns. More specifically, what determined Kasambala's victory in Pakati; why would the Ndali people give Mbembela, who is not a member of their tribe, a 17-1 margin of victory; why did the Lambya voters only give a 5-1 margin of victory to Mbembela, a native son of that area? Second, what broader factors operated against Kasambala which could have made him the target of a protest vote?

Concerning the first question, the Kasambala victory in Pakati undoubtedly was a mixture of the strong support network set up for him, plus such factors as the kinship ties, the chiefly connections, and the quick realisation that the official campaign had gone badly and that an intensive "unofficial" campaign would be needed. Kasambala's concentration of effort on Pakati alone was apparently based on the assumption that he could sweep the division. The few dissenting votes he could expect would be offset by the small support he expected in the non-Nyakyusa areas. In sum, he was counting heavily on the Nyakyusa population majority. The strategy nearly worked. It may have been only the Ndali people living in the Nyakyusa areas that were misjudged. Although they may have professed allegiance to Kasambala, and openly reflected Nyakyusa attitudes, when it came to the ballot many may have voted against their surroundings, and against the man who embodied those surroundings.* It is impossible to tell how many of those voting against him were, in fact, non-Nyakyusa, although we do know that the ethnic minority of the division amounts to about 25%; as noted, the opposition to Kasambala was approximately 20% of those voting in the division. Further analysis of the thirty-two Pakati polling stations does not reveal any particular pattern in Kasambala's favour. Although no exact census figures are available on exactly where the Ndali people live in Pakati, it may be assumed more Ndali are settled in the western portion of the division. These polling stations reflected about the same degree of support for Kasambala as did the rest of the division.†

Our conclusions are that in Pakati, Kasambala had slipped in

* As suggested by the fact that some Ndali leaders are known to have signed Kasambala's nomination papers, but campaigned for Mbembela.

† Two Pakati stations actually cast a majority for Mbembela, Lwangwa-Manow—132-88 and Ijiga—119-81.

popularity, and had it not been for a last minute intensive door-to-door campaign, and a good deal of support from the tea plantations, he might not have carried Pakati by so large a margin.

The Bundali Division 17—1 margin for Mbembela seems explainable only in terms of a strong protest vote. The nature of the protest has been stipulated—remoteness, lack of facilities, falling prices, lack of representation, and the fact that Kasambala was believed to have neglected that division of his constituency.

The close proximity of the Nyakyusa and Ndali is compounded by the fact that a vast majority of Ndali trade funnels through the Nyakyusa areas. Nyakyusa are the economic middlemen, the shopkeepers, and the purveyors of information. For an Ndali farmer, who has carried his produce over miles of mountain trails, such middlemen could easily appear as exploiters, and, over time, the relations between the two ethnic groups understandably become prejudiced.

The Lambya people, seeing themselves less in comparison with the Nyakyusa, were less vehement in their protest. This is based on geographical fact. The Lambya are separated from the Nyakyusa by the Ndali people, and their trade routes are predominately north to Mbozi District, and not through the Nyakyusa areas. Consequently, Mbembela's margin of victory was significantly less here than in Bundali. Moreover, the fact that Mbembela was from Bulambya Division may not have had the "favourite son" effect that seemed to be initially true. He had not come from an established family and had lived much of his adult life in other areas. The actual voting pattern shows that even in his home village of Bupigu, Mbembela did not get the sweeping victory he obtained in Bundali (Bupigu—473 to 123). And, in two Bulambya stations, he was soundly defeated by Kasambala, (Ibaba 275-180; and, Igumila 360-59). The voting in the remaining eleven Bulambya stations was substantially in Mbembela's favour, but the two stations he lost, and his unimpressive victory in his home area indicates that there was sporadic support for Kasambala, as well as locally-based disenchantment for Mbembela.

Concerning the more universal conclusions, it is our contention that four factors—most of which were out of Kasambala's control—mitigated against his re-election, and in fact made him the target of a protest vote. First, a combination of the remote-

ness factors experienced by the Ndali and Lambya, and the ethnocentric inclinations of the Nyakyusa, combined to cause the voting break-downs as they occurred. Stated another way, a protest vote was cast by the Ndali and Lambya at both Kasambala and the wealthy portion of the District. The Nyakyusa, at the same time, reacted favourably to the appeal of their opinion leaders that a vote for any kinsmen would be better than a vote for an outsider. This was reinforced by Kasambala's concentration on his home area in the unofficial campaign.

Second, the complex attitudes surrounding the economic realities of the District caused voters to blame Kasambala for problems totally out of his control. The key problems that were blamed on the Minister were economic depression and lack of progress. The linkage between Kasambala and the economic difficulties of Rungwe could be made by any detractor who wished to articulate the obvious. The argument, if it was made explicit, generally went as follows: The main cash crop in the area is coffee. A decline in the price of coffee over the past ten years has hurt the farmers badly. Farmers are forced to sell their coffee through the co-operative (RACU) although most would prefer to sell to private businessmen who would pay higher prices. Kasambala's position as former manager of RACU was well-known. The Union has been accused of mismanagement and petty theft. Therefore, Kasambala was responsible in part for the individual's loss of money.

The logic is fallacious and indicates the need for a scapegoat in the face of harsh economic realities. Such realities would also include the non-adjustable recurring local taxes that were levied in spite of lower incomes, increased school fees, unemployment, and land shortage. Exaggerated ideas of the prosperity in other districts to the north, mainly Bukoba and Kilimanjaro, created further illusions that the Rungwe area was slipping badly. The sum total was economic discontentment with Kasambala as the convenient individual to blame.

Third, Kasambala had considerable difficulty in maintaining close ties with the Nyakyusa, and in fulfilling all Nyakyusa manners and customs while carrying on an active professional life in Dar es Salaam. This is a classic dilemma: a prominent figure in the capital becomes a target for all his tribesmen travelling to the city. If he does not build a reputation as an open, generous host he runs

the risk of criticism in his home area. If he comes from a tribal society with highly developed forms of etiquette, the difficulty is compounded. Kasambala came in for scathing criticism on this score. To grasp the significance of the problem, the Nyakyusa social pattern should be noted. "The relationships of the Nyakyusa, today fall into four main categories—there are firstly, relationship of blood, marriage and affinity; secondly, there are various bonds of village life; thirdly, there are those which subsist between members of the same chiefdoms and finally, there are those which bind the Nyakyusas to still wider groups, the tribal group, the territory and the world."⁸ It is the last category of relationships which tie the Nyakyusa together when they meet outside their District. Further, "one of the values most constantly stressed by the Nyakyusa is that of *Ukwangala* which, in its primary sense, means 'the enjoyment of good company' and, by extension, the mutual aid and sympathy which springs from personal friendship. It implies urbane manners and friendliness which expresses itself in eating and drinking together, not only merry conversation, but discussion between equals, which the Nyakyusa regard as a principle form of education."⁹ In Dar es Saalam, this would mean a great deal of mixing socially with one's "own people". Kasambala was rumoured to have violated these values. Whether fair or not, his image was that of an "aloof", proud and unapproachable person. Stories thus depicting him filtered back to Rungwe and gave weight to Mbembela's charges. It is also possible that the Ndali, who share a great many Nyakyusa attitudes, also reacted to this "inhospitality" rumour. The argument would be that the chiefly lineage and kinsmen appeals were strong enough to override the "inhospitality" charge among most Nyakyusa, but were inoperative among the Ndali, who share the hospitality custom, but not the close Nyakyusa ties.

Fourth, the Nyakyusa need of change for the sake of change was also apparent. The philosophy seems to be "this man has had his opportunity, let another man have the wealth and prestige of that office." Such an attitude, rooted deeply, would be impossible for Kasambala or anyone else to deal with. As the election neared, a Kinyakyusa saying was commonplace: *alile kako*, "he has had enough . . . it is time for a change".

The implications of the Rungwe election are straightforward. As our central thesis suggests, ethnic factions were of major import-

ance, but they were also compounded by a myriad of complex factors that ultimately determined the election. Kasambala's defeat, along with several other dramatic upsets in the nation, gave substantial proof that even an entrenched politician with a well-run organisation is answerable to the people. Perhaps most important, Rungwe provides a classic example of how free choice can operate in a one-party state.

References

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² See, for example, the basic works by Monica Wilson, *Good Company* London, Oxford University Press, 1951, and *Communal Rituals of the Nyakyusa*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959. The former contains a bibliography on the Nyakyusa. Also see P. H. Gulliver, *Land Tenure and Social Change Among the Nyakyusa*, Kampala, East African Institute of Social Research, 1958.

³ Estimated by Area Secretary, Tukuyu District Office, Tukuyu, Tanzania. 1957 Census official figure was 3,250, see below.

⁴ Projected from the *African Census Report, 1957*. Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1963. See also Gulliver, p. 47.

⁵ *African Census Report, 1957*. Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1963.

⁶ See, for example, Z. E. Kingdon, "The Initiation of a System of Local Government by African Rural Councils in the Rungwe District, Tanganyika," *The Journal of African Administrations*, Vol. III, No. 4, October, 1951.

⁷ District Court Returns, 1960-1965, Tukuyu, Tanzania.

⁸ Godfrey Wilson: *The Land Rights of Individuals Among the Nyakyusa* (The Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 1, 1938), p. 10.

⁹ Monica Wilson, *Good Company* (Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 66.