Technical Report Number
The Web is currently the pre-eminent medium for electronic service delivery to remote users. As a consequence, authentication of servers is more important than ever. Even sophisticated users base their decision whether or not to trust a site on browser cues---such as location bar information, SSL icons, SSL warnings, certificate information, response time, etc. In their seminal work on web spoofing, Felten et al showed how a malicious server could forge some of these cues---but using approaches that are no longer reproducible. However, subsequent evolution of Web tools has not only patched security holes---it has also added new technology to make pages more interactive and vivid. In this paper, we explore the feasibility of web spoofing using this new technology---and we show how, in many cases, every one of the above cues can be forged. In particular, we show how a malicious server can forge all the SSL information a client sees---thus providing a cautionary tale about the security of one of the most common applications of PKI. We stress that these techniques have been implemented, and are available for public demonstration.
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
Yuan, Yougu; Ye, Eileen Zishuang; and Smith, Sean Dartmouth College, "Web Spoofing 2001" (2001). Computer Science Technical Report TR2001-409. https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/cs_tr/185