Abstract
ABSTRACT: This article examines the structural constraints of the United Nations Security Council, with a focus on the veto power of its permanent members and its implications for intervention and peacekeeping. Through a realist lens and grounded in structural analysis, it contends that the recurrent paralysis of the Council in the face of mass atrocities stems from entrenched power asymmetries. The paper advances a bifold proposal: the adoption of the French-Mexican initiative to suspend veto use in cases of mass atrocities, and the entrenchment of the Council’s authority to authorize the use of force under defined conditions. Drawing on case studies such as Iraq and Syria, it demonstrates how institutional mechanisms—rather than normative appeals—are necessary to recalibrate the Council’s capacity to act in a fragmented international order.
Recommended Citation
Aldrighi, Theo
(2025)
"Restrictions on Veto Power: Holding the Permanent Five Accountable in the Face of Intervention and Peacekeeping Operations,"
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs: Vol. 2:
Iss.
1, Article 1.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol2/iss1/1
Included in
Economics Commons, Education Commons, Geography Commons, Law Commons, Legal Studies Commons, Medicine and Health Sciences Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons