Date of Award


Document Type

Thesis (Master's)

Department or Program

Department of Computer Science

First Advisor

Sean Smith


This thesis addresses vulnerabilities in current Trusted Computing architecture by exploring a design for a better Trusted Platform Module (TPM); one that integrates more closely with the CPU's Memory Management Unit (MMU). We establish that software-based attacks on trusted memory can be carried out undetectably by an adversary on current TCG/TPM implementations. We demonstrate that an attacker with sufficient privileges can compromise the integrity of a TPM-protected system by modifying critical loaded code and static data after measurement has taken place. More specifically, these attacks illustrate the Time Of Check vs. Time of Use (TOCTOU) class of attacks. We propose to enhance the MMU, enabling it to detect when memory containing trusted code or data is being maliciously modified at run-time. On detection, it should be able to notify the TPM of these modifications. We seek to use the concepts of selective memory immutability as a security tool to harden the MMU, which will result in a more robust TCG/TPM implementation. To substantiate our ideas for this proposed hardware feature, we designed and implemented a software prototype system, which employs the monitoring capabilities of the Xen virtual machine monitor. We performed a security evaluation of our prototype and validated that it can detect all our software-based TOCTOU attacks. We applied our prototype to verify the integrity of data associated with an application, as well as suggested and implemented ways to prevent unauthorized use of data by associating it with its owner process. Our performance evaluation reveals minimal overhead.


Originally posted in the Dartmouth College Computer Science Technical Report Series, number TR2007-594.