Document Type
Article
Publication Date
5-2003
Publication Title
Journal of Political Economy
Department
Tuck School of Business
Abstract
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new database of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common-law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Pop-Eleches, Cristian; and Shleifer, Andrei, "Judicial Checks and Balances" (2003). Dartmouth Scholarship. 1770.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/1770