Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-2013
Publication Title
The Journal of Law and Economics
Department
Department of Economics
Abstract
We propose an activity-generating theory of regulation. When courts make errors, tort litigation becomes unpredictable and as such imposes risk on firms, thereby discouraging entry, innovation, and other socially desirable activity. When social returns to activity are higher than private returns, it may pay the society to generate some information ex ante about how risky firms are and to impose safety standards based on that information. In some situations, compliance with such standards should entirely preempt tort liability; in others, it should merely reduce penalties. By reducing litigation risk, this type of regulation can raise welfare.
DOI
10.1086/666959
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
Schwartzstein, Joshua and Shleifer, Andrei, "An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation" (2013). Dartmouth Scholarship. 2354.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/2354
