Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2008
Publication Title
The Journal of Politics
Department
Department of Government
Abstract
Redistricting politics in Illinois provide a novel opportunity for testing competing theories of law making. With this in mind, we demonstrate that the post-2000 Census redistricters in Illinois, dominated by Democrats, strategically reshuffled district demographic profiles in an attempt to convert relatively liberal Republican districts to conservative Democratic districts in the state Senate while decreasing and increasing the ideological diversity of the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in the House. Such reshufflings suggest that legislative politics in Illinois are conducted in a manner consistent with vote-buying theories of coalition formation.
DOI
10.1017/S0022381607080115
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
Herron, Michael C. and Wiseman, Alan E., "Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making: A Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois" (2008). Dartmouth Scholarship. 2360.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/2360
