Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2012
Publication Title
American Economic Review
Department
Department of Economics
Abstract
We examine how employers learn about worker productivity in a randomized pilot experiment which provided objective estimates of teacher performance to school principals. We test several hypotheses that support a simple Bayesian learning model with imperfect information. First, the correlation between performance estimates and prior beliefs rises with more precise objective estimates and more precise subjective priors. Second, new information exerts greater influence on posterior beliefs when it is more precise and when priors are less precise. Employer learning affects job separation and productivity in schools, increasing turnover for teachers with low performance estimates and producing small test score improvements. (JEL D83, I21, J24, J45)
DOI
10.1257/aer.102.7.3184
Original Citation
Rockoff, Jonah E., Douglas O. Staiger, Thomas J. Kane, and Eric S. Taylor. 2012. "Information and Employee Evaluation: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention in Public Schools." American Economic Review, 102 (7): 3184-3213. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3184
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
Rockoff, Jonah E.; Staiger, Douglas O.; Kane, Thomas J.; and Taylor, Eric S., "Information and Employee Evaluation: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention in Public Schools" (2012). Dartmouth Scholarship. 2390.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/2390
