Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-2008
Publication Title
American Economic Review
Department
Tuck School of Business
Abstract
We study information transmission via polling. A policymaker polls constituents, who differ in their information and ideology, to determine policy. Full revelation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample, but not with a large one. In large polls, full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists, who respond truthfully, and extremists, who do not. We find polling statistics that ignore strategic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the poll's margin of error. We construct estimators that account for strategic behavior. Finally, we compare polls and elections.
DOI
10.1257/aer.98.3.864
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
Morgan, John and Stocken, Phillip C., "Information Aggregation in Polls" (2008). Dartmouth Scholarship. 2401.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/2401
