Author ORCID Identifier
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
Summer 8-17-2026
Department
Department of Computer Science
Additional Department
Thayer School of Engineering
Abstract
Modern systems cannot credibly depend on every component, account, service, person, supplier, and supporting dependency remaining trustworthy secure throughout the system life cycle. Prevention-centered cybersecurity remains essential, but for mission-critical systems it is not a sufficient engineering strategy. This paper introduces the concept of Engineering for Compromise (EfC), a systems security engineering strategy that deliberately assumes selected system elements may fail, become malicious, lose integrity, or fall under adversary control and then asks whether the system can continue to prevent unacceptable loss. EfC separates component compromise, system compromise, and mission loss as distinct events and uses architecture to place barriers between them. The approach is grounded in the loss-driven systems security engineering concepts and security design principles of NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 1, Revision 1. Domain Separation, Least Privilege, Least Sharing, Least Functionality, Mediated Access, Distributed Privilege, Protective Failure, Anomaly Detection, Protective Recovery, and Compositional Trustworthiness combine to bound adversary authority, limit propagation, preserve critical system properties, and restore an authenticated trustworthy secure state. The paper develops the concepts of compromise containment boundaries, compromise propagation analysis, and compromise margin; describes the evidence needed to substantiate containment claims; and applies the approach across the complete system life cycle. The central proposition is simple: a trustworthy secure system is not necessarily one in which nothing can be compromised. It is one engineered so that compromise does not automatically become catastrophe.
Original Citation
https://ronrossecure.com/library
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
Ross, Ron, "Engineering for Compromise" (2026). Other Faculty Materials. 23.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/faculty_other/23
Comments
This article is intended for Systems Engineers and Systems Security Engineers who are interested in designing and developing trustworthy systems.